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ABSTRACT
Scholarly debate on the legitimacy crisis of investment dispute
resolution has focused on the ability of multinational corporations
to interfere with the state’s right to regulate by challenging government measures in investor-state arbitration. Prior work has addressed the hybrid public-private nature of investment treaties that
allow foreign investors to sue sovereign states and emphasized the
role of multinational corporations in international lawmaking. The
academic discourse misses entirely the fact that international investment law drastically impacts relationships within the corporation (between the shareholders, the management, and the board of
directors) and alters the expectations about the corporation as a
standard-form legal entity. Remarkably, international investment
law allows shareholders to bring in arbitration claims for damages
for “reflective loss”—that is, loss incurred by shareholders indirectly as a result of injury to their company. Shareholders can bring
these claims without consulting with the company’s management
and irrespective of any claims by the corporation. Thus, inherent
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in investment arbitration is the ability of individual shareholders to
make decisions affecting the company and to benefit at the expense
of the corporation, its creditors, and other stakeholders.
Drawing on case studies, this Article seeks to surface the extent
of the impact of shareholder claims for reflective loss on corporate
law and governance—the rules, structure, and processes of the
management and control within the corporation. Having established the distortive impact of shareholder claims on the corporate
legal entity, the Article further explores the ways to address the
systemic problem of reflective loss claims. It makes a normative
argument: in view of the policy goals of foreign investor protection, shareholder claims for reflective loss should be permitted in
international investment law, but only in limited circumstances to
curtail the disruption of corporate governance and to reduce the
social costs of litigation. The Article concludes by offering a novel
private ordering solution to the problem of reflective loss claims. It
argues that the corporate distortion problem is best addressed at
the level of individual corporations through targeted provisions in
corporate charters and bylaws waiving the right of shareholders to
bring reflective loss claims in investment arbitration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a standard-form legal entity, the business corporation provides two types of asset protection. It protects personal assets of its
equity holders from the firm’s creditors (owner shielding) and
firm’s assets from personal creditors of the equity holders (entity
shielding).1 Such asset partitioning within the corporation creates
common expectations among the firm’s shareholders and creditors
as to the corporate form and the effect of contracts entered between
the creditors and the corporation.2 Relying on these expectations,
creditors provide financing to the firm. In doing so, creditors
know that they have a claim against the assets of the company and
expect to be paid in bankruptcy ahead of shareholders according to
the priority rules. On their side, shareholders invest in the company to benefit from capital appreciation or dividends payout. They
expect to have only a residual claim on the corporation’s assets upon its dissolution. Unbeknownst to most creditors and shareholders, international investment law distorts this legal framework of
corporate and bankruptcy law by allowing shareholders to bring
claims for reflective loss in investment arbitration.
Corporate attorneys are often critical of arbitration as a method
of dispute resolution, dismissing arbitration as a proper forum for
resolving corporate disputes. The criticism is largely directed at
domestic arbitration, such as an arbitration that can be commenced
by domestic shareholders in the state of incorporation to challenge
a merger. Members of the Delaware judiciary have expressed concerns that arbitral tribunals may disrupt the development of common law by misapplying Delaware corporate law and keeping
1
See Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, External and Internal Asset Partitioning: Corporations and Their Subsidiaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.,
2018) (“The corporate form partitions assets in two ways. First, it provides owner
shielding . . . second, the corporation provides entity shielding.”); see also Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE
L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is . . . the
shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s
owners or managers.”)
2
See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 8 (2d ed. 2009) (“Entity shielding doctrine is needed to create common expectations, among a firm and its various present and potential creditors, concerning the effect that a contract between a firm
and one of its creditors will have on the security available to the firm’s other creditors.”).
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their decisions private and confidential.3 To “preserve Delaware’s
preeminence in offering cost-effective options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and
technology matters,” Delaware even attempted a state-sponsored
arbitration program.4 Business disputes in these arbitrations were
to be heard by the sitting judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery acting as arbitrators.5 This arbitration experiment has ultimately failed following an opinion by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which upheld a lower court decision
that a confidential program of this type violates the First Amendment right of public access.6
But a bigger threat to the development of corporate law may
come from the investment treaty arbitration. This hybrid form of
international arbitration, also called investor-state arbitration, allows private parties to sue foreign governments for breaches of investor protection obligations. Most important for corporate law
and governance, international investment law allows foreign
shareholders to bring claims for “reflective loss”—that is, loss incurred by shareholders as a result of injury to the company. A
common example of reflective loss is the diminution of the market
value of shares resulting from the company’s loss.
Domestic corporate law and international investment law take
opposing views on shareholder standing for reflective loss. Most
advanced systems of corporate law prohibit shareholder claims for
reflective loss based on the “no reflective loss” principle.7 The no
3 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Appeals Court Throws Out Confidential Arbitration in Delaware, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 23, 2013, 3:59 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/appeals-court-throws-outconfidential-arbitration-in-delaware/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/3SLV-UUZN]
(emphasizing the concern that “corporate law would be made [in private and confidential arbitration] but no one would know about it, making the life of companies and lawyers who advise them much harder.”).
4 See Delaware Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting H.B. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009)).
5
See id. at 522 (noting that sitting judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery
would conduct private arbitrations under the state-sponsored arbitration).
6
See id. at 521 (“[W]e find that there is a First Amendment right of access to
Delaware's government-sponsored arbitrations. We will therefore affirm the order
of the District Court.”).
7 See, e.g., Agrotexim v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 3, 25 (1995) (“It may
be assumed that in the majority of national legal systems shareholders do not
normally have the right to bring an action for damages in respect of an act or an
omission that is prejudicial to ‘their’ company.”); see also Julien Chaisse & Lisa
Zhuoyue Li, Shareholder Protection Reloaded: Redesigning the Matrix of Shareholder
Claims for Reflective Loss, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 53 (2016) (explaining that in do-
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reflective loss principle is largely grounded on policy considerations seeking to avoid double recovery,8 multiple claims and inconsistent outcomes,9 and the negative impact on creditors and
other shareholders.10
By contrast, international investment law, which is driven by
investor protection considerations, allows shareholders to bring
claims for reflective loss, regardless of the claims by the corporation.11 Depending on the treaty, not only a controlling or majority
shareholder,12 but even a minority shareholder13 may be able to
mestic jurisdictions, shareholders may not recover damages for loss in the value
of their shares). See generally id. at 54–58 (providing a review of corporate law
provisions of countries that adhere to the “no reflective loss” principle, such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France and Germany).
8 See, e.g., Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 82 (discussing the various policy considerations underlining the no reflective loss principle and the rationale as to why
double recovery should be avoided).
9 For instance, in decisions such as CME v. Czech Republic and Lauder v. Czech
Republic, different tribunals rendered different decisions based on the same facts.
See CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Partial Award, ¶ 620 (Sept. 13, 2001) (stating that the Respondent used the same
pleadings and witness statements that were originally drafted for the Respondent
in Lauder v. Czech Republic); Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, ¶¶ 176–80 (Sept. 3, 2001); see also Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v. Italian
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/50, Decision on Respondent’s Application under Rule 41(5), ¶¶ 20–21 (Mar. 20, 2017) [hereinafter Eskosol] (raising legal consistency and certainty as an argument where Italy objected to an arbitration commenced by Italian company Eskosol S.p.A. following a separate arbitration which
was brought against Italy and lost by Eskosol’s majority shareholder).
10
See, e.g., Victor Joffe & James Mather, The Vanishing Exception Part One:
How Rare Are Exceptions to the No Reflective Loss Principle, NEW L.J., Nov. 28, 2008,
https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/vanishing-exception
[https://perma.cc/BY58-AQY2] (“The existence of the rule is justified by the need
both to prevent double recovery and to provide protection for the company’s
creditors, who might be prejudiced if the shareholder’s claim were to succeed.”).
11
See Christoph Schreuer, Shareholder Protection in International Investment
Law, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., no. 3, 2005, at 4, https://www.transnationaldispute-management.com/article.asp?key=426 [https://perma.cc/FA5X-MRZR]
(noting that “practice since 1970 . . . demonstrates an increasing willingness to
grant an independent standing to shareholders. Most of this practice [arose] in
cases in which shareholders pursued their own claims through international investment arbitration.”). See generally Chaisse & Li, supra note 7 (discussing the divergence between domestic company and administrative law and international
investment law with respect shareholder standing for reflective loss and arguing
that “allowing recovery for reflective loss [under international investment law] is
a sound legal principle from a practical, legal, and policy perspective.”).
12
Investment arbitrations brought by majority or controlling shareholders
are numerous. See, e.g., EuroGas Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/14,
Award,
¶
325
(Aug.
18,
2017),
https://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/6233
[https://perma.cc/22RKWLVL] (“On 17 August 2013, Mr. Alexander Danicek, an executive of Rozmin
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bring a claim in investor-state arbitration.14 In addition to direct
shareholders, the right to sue for reflective loss may be available to
indirect shareholders of the corporation.15 As a result, investment
from 2008 to 2014, stated before Austrian criminal authorities that EuroGas
owned a 90% share in Rozmin.”); Emergofin B.V. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No.
ARB/16/35
(claimants
held
68.01%
of
stock),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/751
[https://perma.cc/9GQU-XKYT]; Unión Fenosa Gas, S.A. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/4, Notice of Arbitration (Feb. 27, 2014) (80% of
stock),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/567
[https://perma.cc/59JH-J7LN]; ASA International S.p.A. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/23, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 13, 2013) (85% of
stock),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/525
[https://perma.cc/ZG56-GRSE]; EVN AG v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case
No. ARB/13/17, Notice of Arbitration (July 19, 2013) (67% of stock),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/518
[https://perma.cc/9W8C-QU6H].
13 See RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/2005,
Final Award, ¶ 608 (Sept. 12, 2010) (noting that “the recent jurisprudence from
investment arbitration tribunals considering other investment treaties has confirmed the ability for shareholders to claim for measures taken against the company in which they hold shares and has been developed to the point accepting
that minority shareholders have made claims for indirect damage.”). Arbitrations
involving minority shareholders are numerous. See, e.g., Koch Minerals Sàrl v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/19, Award, ¶ 5.1 (Oct.
30, 2017) (describing arbitrations involving minority shareholders, and, in this
particular case, the minority shareholders held 25% of stock); Lanco Int’l, Inc. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 10 (Dec. 8, 1998) (“[T]he fact that LANCO holds an equity share of 18.3% in
the capital stock of the Grantee allows one to conclude that it is an investor . . . .”);
Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Oct. 21, 2003) (involving two corporate claimants
holding 20% and 5% of issued stock in a company formed and incorporated under
the laws of Egypt); GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
¶ 1 (Nov. 15, 2004) (“GAMI owns 14.18% of the shares of Grupo Azucarero Mexico
SA de CV (‘GAM’).”); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 19 (July 17,
2003) (“CMS purchased the shares still remaining in government hands that represented 25% of TGN, and later purchased an additional 4.42% that had been assigned to an employee share program, thus totaling 29.42% of TGN.”).
14 At least one tribunal held that it was irrelevant whether a shareholder was
a majority or a minority shareholder as long as the treaty provided protection to
shareholders. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/1, Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 50
(Apr. 30, 2004) (“The Respondent has not disputed that those shares are ‘owned or
controlled directly or indirectly’ by the Claimants. In that connection, it is irrelevant whether the shares are majority or minority shares.”).
15
See, e.g., Venezuela Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 165 (June 10, 2010) [hereinafter Venezuela Holdings] (allowing an indirect shareholder to assert claims
under a BIT relying on the literal reading of the treaty, which granted protection
to investments without distinguishing between direct and indirect investments).
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tribunals have allowed double recovery and rendered conflicting
awards to related claimants at different levels of the corporate
ownership structure. To achieve greater consistency of arbitral
awards and avoid double recovery, scholars have suggested claim
consolidation, reliance on res judicata, and damage apportionment
among related claimants, all procedural solutions. However, as I
argue in this Article, the problem with reflective loss claims goes
further than double recovery, conflicting awards, and increased
costs of dispute resolution. Reflective loss claims distort corporate
governance choices in a way that cannot be fixed by international
law and civil procedure solutions.
By granting shareholders a direct right to bring claims in arbitration, investor protection treaties effectively create a separate
class of stakeholders in the company—treaty-protected shareholders—whose rights are prioritized over the rights of the company as
well as its management, creditors, and other stakeholders. Rational treaty-protected shareholders will always attempt to recover
corporate losses regardless of the interests of the corporation and
other stakeholders. In doing so, they may interfere with management decisions and may demand concessions at the expense of the
company. Shareholder claims also make it more difficult for the
company to settle because a settlement agreement concluded by
the company would not extinguish shareholder claims, making a
responding state reluctant to settle.16 In addition, by collecting
damages otherwise owed to the company, treaty-protected shareholders prioritize their claims over the claims of creditors and all
other stakeholders of the corporation. This practice is especially
dangerous for companies in financial distress. Consequently,
shareholder claims for reflective loss distort corporate law and
governance—the rules, structure, and processes of the management and control within the corporation. And as the number of
investor-state arbitrations continues to grow,17 so will the influence
16 See, e.g., David Gaukrodger, Investment Treaties as Corporate Law: Shareholder Claims and Issues of Consistency 33–34 (OECD, Working Papers on International
Investment
2013/03),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3w9t44mt0v-en
[https://perma.cc/83GC-A2AU] (explaining that “uncertainties associated with
shareholder claims may complicate settlement negotiations.”)
17
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017:
INVESTMENT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, at xii, U.N. Sales No. E.17.II.D.3 (2017)
[hereinafter UNCTAD 2017 REPORT] (“The rate of new treaty-based investor-State
dispute settlement (ISDS) cases continued unabated.”). Most recently, the
UNCTAD reported on 62 new known ISDS cases initiated in 2016 pursuant to
IIAs, which is “higher than the 10-year average of 49 cases per year (2006–2015).”
Id. at 114. By the beginning of 2017, “the total number of publicly known ISDS
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of international investment law on domestic corporate law and
governance.
This Article has two goals. First, it seeks to examine how
shareholder claims for reflective loss permitted under international
investment law affect domestic corporate law, corporate governance, and the structure and corporate ownership chains of companies investing abroad. Prior work has examined the history and
evolution of shareholder standing under international investment
law by exploring the practice of investment tribunals.18 Separately,
recent policy papers have addressed theoretical concerns about the
effects of shareholder claims for reflective loss on corporate law
and governance.19 To my knowledge, this is the first work that
seeks to combine corporate law and international investment law
tools to provide a comprehensive study of shareholder claims for
reflective loss and their impact on corporate law and governance.
The second goal of this Article is to provide a solution to the
problem of reflective loss claims and distortions these claims create
on corporate law and governance choices. The legal framework of
reflective loss claims and the practice of arbitral tribunals suggest
that corporate law, international law, and civil procedure rules are
not equipped to deal with the impact of these claims on corporate
governance and structure. The Article makes a normative argument: in view of the policy goals of foreign investment protection,
shareholder claims for reflective loss should be permitted in international investment law, but only in limited circumstances to curtail the disruption of corporate governance and to reduce the social
costs of litigation. The Article offers a private ordering solution to
claims had reached 767.” Id.
18
See, e.g., Schreuer, supra note 11, at 6–7 (detailing arbitral practice and the
impact a shareholder’s investment has on the shareholder’s standing); Chaisse &
Li, supra note 7, at 64 (remarking on how over the last three decades, “out of the
more than 300 investment awards made, fourteen awards . . . explicitly address[ed] the issue of the meaning of investment in the context of international
disputes.”); Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations
and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as “Investors” under Investment
Treaties, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 387, 387 (2005) (noting how in recent years, there
has been a “rapid increase in the number of international arbitrations between
foreign investors and host governments.”).
19 See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 24 (explaining that the no reflective
loss principle “is a long-standing rule primarily generated by case law.”); OECD,
The Impact of Investment Treaties on Companies, Shareholders and Creditors, in OECD
BUSINESS AND FINANCE OUTLOOK 223, 234–46 (2016) [hereinafter OECD Policy Paper] (illustrating how the various incentives created by rules that govern the types
of loss recoverable by shareholders affect companies, shareholders, and creditors).
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the problem of reflective loss claims, arguing that the corporate
distortion problem is best addressed at the level of individual corporations through targeted provisions in the corporation’s governing documents—corporate charters and bylaws.
Following this introduction, Part 2 of the Article examines reflective loss claims under domestic corporate and international investment law, focusing on the corporate law of the United States,
United Kingdom, and Germany. It also explores the concept of
shareholder claims for reflective loss in the practice of international
investment tribunals. Part 3 first discusses theoretical concerns
about the impact of reflective loss claims on corporate law and
governance, and examines empirical evidence and case studies of
investment disputes that have impacted corporate governance and
structure choices of the companies investing abroad. Based on
these insights, it then draws lessons for the law and public policy
on how to deal with the negative impact of reflective loss claims on
corporate law and governance. Part 4 explores whether international law and civil procedure rules can restore distortions created
by reflective loss claims and offers a private ordering solution to
the problem of shareholder claims for reflective loss. A short conclusion follows.
2. REFLECTIVE LOSS UNDER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW

Shareholders can suffer two types of loss: direct loss and indirect, or reflective, loss.20 Shareholders incur direct loss when they
are deprived of or restricted in their rights as shareholders, such as
the rights to vote or to share proceeds upon dissolution of the
company.21 Shareholders also suffer direct loss when their shares
are cancelled22 or expropriated.23 Under most domestic law sys20
See Bas J. de Jong, Shareholders’ Claims for Reflective Loss: A Comparative Legal Analysis, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 97, 99 (2013) (explaining that it is not always
easy to distinguish between direct and reflective loss and to identify whether an
exception to the “no reflective loss” principle can be applied; in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom, these issues have led to the extensive case law and literature on the subject).
21 See generally Gaukrodger, supra note 16.
22
See Olczak v. Poland, 2002-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 239, 252 (holding that shareholders can claim victim status if they can establish direct loss in the form of
shares’ cancellation).
23
See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 3 (“The damage done to the shareholder
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tems—including those of the United States, United Kingdom,
Germany, and the Netherlands— shareholders can recover direct
loss by bringing a claim for losses resulting from a breach of a duty
owed to shareholders by a third party.24
Shareholders suffer reflective loss when there is an injury to
“their” company that affects the company’s value or profitability,
but the loss to the company also reflects on shareholders, for instance, by decreasing the value of their shares or diminishing dividend payout.25 In contrast to direct loss, shareholders generally
cannot recover reflective loss under domestic law. The laws of
Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all follow the
so-called “no reflective loss” principle, which prohibits shareholders from recovering reflective loss.26 Instead, corporate laws of
these countries give the corporation the right to bring a claim for
its (direct) loss.27 The no reflective loss principle recognizes the
company’s autonomy and views the loss by shareholders merely as
a reflection of the corporate loss. Inherent within the no reflective
loss principle is the proposition that once the corporation successfully recovers its loss (and replenishes its assets), the economic inmay affect its rights as shareholder directly, such as the expropriation of its
shares, or the damage may be done indirectly, such as the diminution of the profitability or value of the company.”).
24 See de Jong, supra note 20, at 98–99 (explaining the definition of a loss, specifically the loss the shareholder may recover if a third party breaches duties owed
to the company and the shareholder).
25
See id. at 98 (“A reflective loss . . . is a decrease in the value of the share
that corresponds to the diminution in the value of the company.”); see also
ANDREW CHARMAN & JOHAN DU TOIT, SHAREHOLDER ACTIONS 161 (2013) (explaining
that “loss does not only affect the company’s balance sheet, but should have, to
some extent, the effect of a diminution of [company’s] share price or share value.”).
26
See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 1621, at 15–17 (discussing the laws of the
United States, Canada, U.K., Germany, and France, and noting that the laws of
Australia, China, and Hong Kong similarly adhere to the no reflective loss principle); see also Hans de Wulf, Direct Shareholder Suits for Damages Based on Reflective
Losses, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KLAUS J. HOPT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG AM 24. AUGUST 2010:
UNTERNEHMEN, MARKT UND VERANTWORTUNG 1537, 1547–48 (Stefan Grundmann et
al. eds., 2010) (discussing the law of the Netherlands and recounting a Dutch Supreme Court ruling on shareholder’s rights).
27 See de Jong, supra note 20, at 98 (detailing what a reflective loss means and
how it relates to direct losses); see also CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161
(describing U.K. law and noting that “a shareholder is usually not permitted to
recover any such loss or damage [suffered at the hands of third parties] if it overlaps with, or is reflective of, any loss suffered by the company arising out of the
wrongdoing.”).
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terests of shareholders will be served as well.28 Prior work has
suggested that shareholders can benefit from “an improved share
price or value, the payment of dividends, [and/or] the declaration
of enhanced dividends.”29
Despite general reluctance to compensate shareholders for reflective loss, domestic law recognizes that shareholder claims for
reflective loss may sometimes be warranted; for instance, where
the corporation ceases to exist or is unable to submit a claim.30 For
these rare cases, domestic law provides for exceptions to the no reflective loss principle, allowing shareholders to bring direct claims
for losses suffered by the company.31 The courts are cognizant of
the conflicting interests of, on the one hand, shareholders seeking
recovery for reflective loss, and, on the other hand, interests of the
company, its creditors, and other stakeholders.32 In Johnson v. Gore
Wood & Co., Lord Bingham described the balancing exercise that
the courts perform in assessing the claims for reflective loss:
On the one hand the court must respect the principle of
company autonomy, ensure that the company’s creditors
are not prejudiced by the action of individual shareholders
and ensure that a party does not recover compensation for
a loss which another party has suffered. On the other, the
court must be astute to ensure that the party who has in fact
suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied fair compensation.33
Thus, compensation of reflective loss requires weighing the in28
See CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161–62 (describing the assumption behind the no reflective loss rule that “the economic interests of shareholders
will be served by the company’s . . . recovery, by benefiting from one or more of
an improved share price or value, the payment of dividends, or the declaration of
enhanced dividends.”); see also Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1291 (5th
Cir. 1989), rev’d, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (“A corporation can protect its shareholder’s
interest by suing in the corporate name, and if the suit is successful the proceeds
will inure to the benefit of the corporation; this increases the value of the individual shares in proportion to the amount of the recovery”).
29 CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161–62.
30
See, e.g., Giles v. Rhind [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1428 (Eng.) (holding that
shareholders may submit a reflective loss claims because the company was unable
to submit its own claims due to the defendant’s actions).
31 See infra Part 2.1. for a discussion of corporate law of the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands.
32
See, e.g., Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66–67 (appeal
taken from Eng.) (noting how the treatment of the company and shareholder as
one would impact the recovery of the reflective loss).
33 Id. at 36.
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terests of shareholders against the interests of the company and its
creditors to identify instances where compensation of shareholders
does not distort the principle of company autonomy or benefit
shareholders at the expense of the company’s creditors.
In sharp contrast to domestic corporate law, international investment law is largely blind to these concerns. Driven by investor
protection considerations, investment treaties allow both direct
and indirect shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss. As a
result, controlling, majority, and sometimes minority shareholders
have been able to recover reflective loss in investment arbitration,
independently of any claims submitted by their company.
2.1. Corporate law in the United States, U.K., and Germany
In the United States, the concept of “reflective loss” does not
exist under state corporate or federal securities law.34 The taxonomy of shareholder claims in the United States includes derivative
actions brought by shareholders on behalf of the company (for instance, corporate governance suits alleging breaches of fiduciary
duties by management or board of directors) and direct actions
brought by shareholders on their own behalf. In turn, direct actions include class actions—such as mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) and securities class actions—which shareholders bring as
representatives of other shareholders similarly injured, and individual actions by shareholders, including actions by shareholders
who opted out of class actions.
In the context of derivative actions, the courts distinguish two
types of harm: harm suffered by the company and harm suffered
by shareholders. It is the harm to the company, not to shareholders, that shareholders can recover through derivative suits.35 In
Tooley v. Donaldson, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the issue of whether a stockholder’s claim is derivative or direct turns
“solely on the following questions: (1) who suffered the alleged
harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and
(2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy

34
See Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 57 (highlighting the way in which the
United States handles the concept of “reflective loss”).
35
See, e.g., Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (explaining the mechanism by which a shareholder may bring a derivative suit).
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(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”36 The law is
thus clear that derivative suits provide a tool for shareholders to
sue on the company’s behalf for the harm suffered by the company
when those in control of the corporation fail to assert a company’s
claim.37
The harm suffered by shareholders—both direct and reflective
loss—is not recoverable by shareholders through derivative suits.
To recover direct loss, a shareholder can bring an individual action
if a duty was owed directly to the shareholder.38 Under Delaware
law, “[t]he stockholder’s claimed direct injury must be independent of any alleged injury to the corporation. The stockholder must
demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the stockholder
and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the
corporation.”39
With respect to reflective loss, the law generally does not provide shareholders with the right to sue.40 Instead, the law explicitly prohibits shareholder claims for reflective loss largely because of
policy considerations, such as avoidance of double recovery, excessive litigation, and inconsistent and conflicting awards. Permitting
shareholder claims for reflective loss would allow shareholders to
36

2004).

Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del.

37
See, e.g., R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.10, at 23–24 (Supp. 2014) (citing
Kramer, 546 A.2d at 351) (“The derivative action was developed to enable stockholders to sue on behalf of the corporation where those in control of the corporation refused to assert a claim belonging to it.”).
38 See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1562 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (noting
that where a shareholder cannot bring a derivative suit because a harm was
caused to the shareholder, “a shareholder may still bring suit if a director violates
a duty arising from a contract or representation owing directly to [the shareholder].”).
39 Tooley, supra note 36, at 1039.
40
See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 15 (stating that “[a]s a general rule, only
the company can sue to recover the loss”); see also Gaubert v. United States, 885
F.2d 1284, 1291 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, individual shareholders have no separate right to sue for damages suffered by the corporation which result solely in the
diminution of the value of the corporation’s shares.” (citations omitted)); F.D.I.C.,
802 F. Supp. at 1562 (“As a matter of law, a cause of action for injury to the property of a corporation or for destruction of its business is vested in the corporation .
. . . A corporate shareholder has no individual cause of action for personal damages caused solely by wrong done to the corporation.” (citations omitted)); Sutter
v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 170 P.2d 898, 900–01 (Cal. 1946) (“Generally, a stockholder may not maintain an action in his own behalf for a wrong done by a third
person to the corporation on the theory that such wrong devalued his stock and
the stock of the other shareholders . . . .”).

OF

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/5

2018]

Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss

203

recover twice, either at the expense of the defendant (if it pays
twice), or the company and its creditors and other stakeholders (if
a shareholder sues and recovers first and the amount of his recovery is then deducted from damages awarded to the corporation).41
The courts have also proven to be unsympathetic to shareholder
claimants who use the corporate entity to shield from unlimited liability, but then turn around and seek to disregard the corporate
entity to claim for reflective loss.42
Although not allowed under domestic law, in theory shareholder claims for reflective loss are distinguishable from other categories of shareholder claims in the United States. First, they are
direct suits by shareholders. By contrast to derivate suits brought
on behalf of the company, shareholder claims for reflective loss are
brought by shareholders on their own behalf. In addition, claims
for reflective loss allow shareholders to personally recover their
losses, instead of securing recovery to their company in derivative
actions. Derivate suits are also usually limited to corporate “insiders”—people involved in some way in corporate governance, such
as directors, officers, controlling shareholders.43 Derivative suits
against third parties are generally impossible or, where they are allowed, rare in practice.44 To sum up, shareholder claims for reflective loss do what the derivative suits prohibit—they allow shareholder to bring claims against third parties, such as business
counter-parties or host states in investment arbitration, for breaches of duties owned to the company. Shareholder claims for reflective loss also differ from class actions under federal securities and
state corporate laws in that reflective loss claims allege a breach of
a duty owned to the company that resulted in an injury to share41 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 62 (“If the shareholder is allowed to recover in respect of [reflective] loss, then either there will be
double recovery at the expense of the defendant or the shareholder will recover at
the expense of the company and its creditors and other shareholders. Neither
course can be permitted . . . .”). But see Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 86 (arguing
that a low risk of double recovery does not justify a bar of reflective loss because
double recovery occurs in rare instances where “the shareholder sues first and recovers and then the company sues and recovers.”).
42
See, e.g., Alford v. Frontier Enter., Inc., 599 F.2d 483, 484 (1st. Cir. 1979)
(holding that a shareholder cannot claim reflective loss because that would suggest “[the shareholder] is attempting to use the corporate form both as shield and
sword at his will . . . . Of course, this is impermissible.”).
43
See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 20 (“This regime for shareholder
claims for reflective loss is essentially circumscribed to claims against corporate ‘insiders’.”).
44 See id. at 19–21 (describing shareholder derivative actions generally).
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holders. By contrast, securities and M&A class actions allege
breach of duties owned directly to shareholders.
In the United Kingdom, corporate law is well familiar with the
term “reflective loss.”45 The U.K. law generally follows the no reflective loss principle, but provides for several exceptions discussed below. The no reflective loss principle as we know it today
dates back to the case of Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2).46 The Court of Appeal in Prudential held that
the shareholder cannot recover reflective losses, explaining that:
[W]hat [a shareholder] cannot do is to recover damages
merely because the company in which he is interested has
suffered damage. He cannot recover a sum equal to the
diminution in the market value of his shares, or equal to the
likely diminution in dividend, because such a “loss” is
merely a reflection of the loss suffered by the company.
The shareholder does not suffer any personal loss. His only
“loss” is through the company, in the diminution in the
value of the net assets of the company . . . .47
More recently, the House of Lords discussed the principle in its
decision in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co., where Lord Bingham summarized the U.K. case law on reflective loss.48 The case suggests
45
See, e.g., Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 (discussing
“reflective loss” by shareholders); Gardner v. Parker [2004] EWCA (Civ) 781 [1]
(Eng.) (“This appeal raises, not for the first time, the ambit and limits of the rule
against reflective loss . . . .”); see also Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (explaining that
“[r]eflective loss is . . . the loss suffered by a shareholder where there is both
breach of a duty owed to the company, and breach of a duty owed to the shareholder, but the shareholder’s loss would be made good if the company enforced
its rights against the wrongdoer . . . .”); CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 161–
83 (devoting a separate chapter to non-recoverability of reflective loss under English company law).
46
See generally Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (outlining the case law that has
directed present thought on reflective loss).
47
Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Indus. Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] Ch
204 (CA) 222–23.
48 Lord Bingham summarized the law on reflective loss as:

(1) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty owed to it,
only the company may sue in respect of that loss. No action lies at the
suit of a shareholder suing in that capacity and no other to make good a
diminution in the value of the shareholder’s shareholding where that
merely reflects the loss suffered by the company. . . . [E]ven if the company . . . has declined or failed to make good that loss. . . . (2) Where a
company suffers loss but has no cause of action to sue to recover that
loss, the shareholder in the company may sue in respect of it (if the
shareholder has a cause of action to do so), even though the loss is a dim-
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that under U.K. law the recovery of reflective loss will not be permitted even if the company is not pursuing an independent claim;
for instance, because the period of limitations has expired for the
company (but not the shareholders), or the company chooses not to
bring a claim.49 It is irrelevant that the shareholder has a separate
cause of action, as the law prohibits recovery for reflective loss regardless of the existence of a separate cause of action for the shareholder.50 It is further irrelevant that a court could avoid double recovery by carefully drafting its decision.51
The case law also provides for exceptions—or, as some commentators have argued, the limits52—to the no reflective loss prininution in the value of the shareholding. . . . (3) Where a company suffers loss caused by a breach of duty to it, and a shareholder suffers a loss
separate and distinct from that suffered by the company caused by
breach of a duty independently owed to the shareholder, each may sue
to recover the loss caused to it by breach of the duty owed to it but neither may recover loss caused to the other by breach of the duty owed to
that other.
Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 35–36 (citations omitted).
49 See id. See also Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (summarizing the no reflective
loss principle); CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 162–63 (discussing the case
law on the no reflective loss principle and noting two exceptions to the basic
proposition: “if the company refuses to recover its loss, shareholders may intervene . . . by derivative action procedures; and . . . if the wrongdoer makes it impossible for the company to recover its loss, shareholders may be able to recover
in respect to their own loss, even where it is reflective loss.”).
50 The English Court of Appeal held that:
It does not matter that [the shareholder]’s and [the company]’s causes of
action are different. The essential point is that [the shareholder]’s claim
against [the defendant] is in substance a claim for compensation in respect of the same loss to which [the company] has a claim against him. . .
. [The shareholder’s] loss will be made good if the wronged company,
which has the primary claim, enforces in full its claims against the
wrongdoer.
Gardner v. Parker [2003] EWHC (Ch) 1463 [41] (Eng.).
51 Joffe & Mather, supra note 10 (“[T]he existence of the rule is justified by the
need both to prevent double recovery and to provide protection for the company’s creditors, who might be prejudiced if the shareholder’s claim were to succeed.”).
52 Joffe & Mather have argued that exceptions to the no reflective loss principle are in fact the limits on the no reflective loss principle. The authors have explained:
Where the defendant owes a duty to the shareholder but not to the company, or where the shareholder’s loss is separate and distinct, the no reflective loss principle has no application at all. They are not situations in
which duties are owed to both company and the shareholder, and the
shareholder’s loss is reflective, but it is nonetheless permitted to sue to
recover that loss.
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ciple under U.K. law. First, a shareholder can bring a claim for reflective loss under U.K. law if the company has no cause of action
to recover its loss.53 Second, a shareholder can bring a claim for reflective loss if the “breach of duty was owed to [the shareholder]
personally; and . . . [their loss was] separate and distinct from the
loss suffered by the company.”54 Third, the Court of Appeal in
Giles v. Rhind—where Lord Justice Walker allowed a shareholder to
claim for reflective loss where the defendant (the wrongdoer) disabled the company from pursuing that cause of action—identified
an additional exception under U.K law.55 The Giles v. Rhind exception allowed for the consideration of the impact of a defendant’s
conduct in determining a shareholder’s standing to assert a claim
for reflective loss.
Prior work has shown that civil law jurisdictions, such as Germany, France, and the Netherlands, similarly prohibit shareholder
claims for reflective loss.56 Among these countries, Germany adheres to the strongest version of the no reflective loss principle,57
usually banning shareholder recovery for reflective loss. De Wulf
has discussed an important decision by the German Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) of November 10, 1986, where the court rejected a shareholder claim for reflective loss because “this would run
counter to the principle of capital maintenance . . . and would be
incompatible with the fact that company property or assets are
earmarked for a specific goal, namely the company’s purpose . . .
.”58 According to the BGH, the shareholder could claim for “sepaId.
53
See Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 (“The test is not
whether the company could have made a claim in respect of the loss in question;
the question is whether, treating the company and the shareholder as one for this
purpose, the shareholder’s loss is franked by that of the company.”).
54 CHARMAN & DU TOIT, supra note 25, at 174.
55
See Giles v. Rhind [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1428 (Eng.); see also Victor Joffe &
James Mather, The Vanishing Exception Part Two: Victor Joffe & James Mather Continue Their Reflections on Controversial Cases on Ability to Pay, NEW L.J., Dec. 5, 2008,
https://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/content/vanishing-exception-0
[https://perma.cc/49J8-7BLL] (describing the facts and outcome of Giles v. Rhind
in detail).
56
See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 17–18 (discussing Germany and
France); see also de Jong, supra note 20, at 99 (“The basic rule in most jurisdictions,
including the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, is that a shareholder cannot recover a loss which is simply reflective of the company’s loss.”).
57
See de Jong, supra note 20, at 107 (“German law strictly adheres to the ‘no
reflective loss’ principle.”).
58 de Wulf, supra note 26, at 1545.
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rate, direct damage,” but not for reflective loss resulting from the
injury to the company.59 Similarly, in France, a shareholder can only claim for “personal injury” that is independent from the injury
suffered by the company.60 The French courts have dismissed
shareholder claims where the injury to shareholder was only corollary to the injury of the company.61
Consequently, most advanced systems of corporate law unanimously prohibit shareholder claims for reflective loss, allowing
only limited exceptions to the no reflective loss principle. For most
domestic systems of law—including the legal systems of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany—it is irrelevant
whether the shareholder has a separate cause of action, as these legal systems prohibit shareholder claims for reflective loss in either
case.62 In general, it appears that the nature of the loss—reflective
loss to shareholders resulting from a direct loss to the company—
largely determines the prohibition of the recovery, regardless of a
separate cause of action by shareholders.
The no reflective loss principle does, however, have weaknesses. First, the principle is based on the assumption that the company will be able to bring its own claim. Further, it assumes that
once the company recovers its losses, the shareholders will recover
indirectly. For instance, the indirect recovery may occur through
dividend payout; but, it is unclear whether this payout would restore the economic interests of the shareholders and, consequently,
put shareholders in a position they would have found themselves
in if the loss had never occurred. Furthermore, even if the share
price or value is restored, this would not provide recovery to
shareholders that sold their shares at a lower price prior to recovery by the company.
Despite these concerns, the no reflective loss principle is commonly accepted as a practical and fair solution. It is also supported
by sound policy considerations, such as the avoidance of double
recovery, increase of judicial economy, and consistency and predictability of court decisions.63 And so, in unusual unison, both efId.
See id. at 1557–61 (discussing French law).
61
See id. at 1559 (explaining that shareholder suffering because of dropped
stocks is actually a corollary to damage suffered by the company).
62
See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 17 (explaining that Germany and
France typically do not allow shareholders to make claims for reflective loss).
63
See id. at 7 (“Courts in advanced systems of national corporate law, however, generally reject shareholder claims for reflective loss—largely for explicit
59
60
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ficiency and fairness concerns dictate the no reflective loss principle, barring shareholders from claiming reflective loss under domestic corporate law.64
2.2. International investment law: Treaties and the practice of arbitral
tribunals
In international investment law, the concept of shareholder
standing has developed through the practice of arbitral tribunals
called upon to interpret investment treaty provisions as part of investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”). Historically, shareholders
that invested abroad could only seek protection through the customary international law of diplomatic protection. Similar to domestic law, customary international law distinguishes between direct and reflective loss and generally granted protection to
shareholders only for direct loss.65 The role of customary international law has diminished over time with the growth of investor
protection treaties, which largely replaced customary international
law in the area of investment protection.66
Today, there are over 3,300 international investment agreements (IIAs) that provide foreign investors with various investor
protections— such as non-discrimination, fair and equitable treatment (FET), and full protection and security (FPS)—and may also
contain the state’s consent to arbitration.67 Treaties protect various
policy reasons relating to consistency, predictability, avoidance of double recovery, and judicial economy.”).
64 See id. at 3 (“Limiting recovery to the company [under domestic law] is
seen as both more efficient and fairer to all interested parties.”).
65
See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 88 (Feb. 5) (“[W]here it is a question of an unlawful act
committed against a company representing foreign capital, the general rule of international law authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a
claim.”); see also Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 20 (providing examples from German, French, U.K. and Japanese law).
66
See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 45 (July 17, 2003)
(“To some extent, diplomatic protection is intervening as a residual mechanism to
be resorted to in the absence of other arrangements recognizing the direct right of
action by individuals. It is precisely this kind of arrangement that has come to
prevail under international law . . . .”).
67
See UNCTAD 2017 REPORT, supra note 17, at xii (“In 2016, 37 new IIAs
were concluded, bringing the total number of treaties to 3,324 by year-end . . . .”).
But see id. (“Over the same time, terminations of at least 19 IIAs became effective,
with more to come.”).
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forms of investments and may cover shares, stock, and other forms
of equity participation in the company. Reflecting the treaty practice, arbitral tribunals have consistently allowed shareholders in
investment arbitrations to bring claims for reflective loss since
1970.68 In doing so, the tribunals have sought guidelines from the
terms of investment treaties and, in the words of the Teinver v. Argentina tribunal, have “refus[ed] to take the cues from domestic
corporate law,”69 which generally prohibits reflective loss claims.
Where treaties protect foreign investments in equity securities, it is
settled law today that shareholders have independent standing
under IIAs to bring individual claims for losses suffered by the
company.70
Arbitral tribunals examine shareholding issues at the beginning
of an arbitration to establish whether a tribunal has the right to
hear a claim71—the jurisdictional approach—or whether a claim by
68 See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 4 (“[P]ractice since 1970, the year of the decision in Barcelona Traction, demonstrates an increasing willingness to grant an independent standing to shareholders.”); see also CMS Gas Transmission Company
v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 48 (July 17, 2003) (“The Tribunal therefore finds no bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by shareholders independently
from those of the corporation concerned, not even if those shareholders are minority or non-controlling shareholders.”). See generally Alexandrov, supra note 18 (reviewing early arbitral tribunal practice that affirmed the status of shareholders as
investors under investment treaties).
69
Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ¶ 212 (Dec. 21, 2012).
70
See, e.g., Enron v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 39 (Jan. 14, 2004) (noting that “there is nothing contrary to
international law or the ICSID Convention in upholding the concept that shareholders may claim independently from the corporation concerned, even if those
shareholders are not in the majority or in control of the company.”).
71
Arbitral tribunals and scholars disagree as to whether the shareholder
standing constitutes an issue of jurisdiction or, instead, of admissibility of a claim.
The distinction between the issues of admissibility and jurisdiction is not always
easy to draw. Crawford distinguishes the two concepts as follows:

Objections to jurisdiction relate to conditions affecting the parties’ consent to have the tribunal decide the case at all . . . . An objection to the
admissibility of a claim invites the tribunal to dismiss (or perhaps postpone) the claim on a ground which, while it does not exclude its authority in principle, affects the possibility or propriety of its deciding the particular case at the particular time.
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 693 (8th
ed. 2012).
As a result, there is “a degree of confusion and indifference in international investment law” as to the difference between these two concepts. Tania Voon et al.,
Legal Responses to Corporate Manoeuvring in International Investment Arbitration, 5 J.
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a shareholder can be brought in arbitration—the admissibility approach. Once arbitral tribunals identify the first entity or a physical person that has standing in investment arbitration, they usually
end their jurisdictional analysis and proceed to the merits of a
claim.72 The tribunals also look at shareholding at the end of the
arbitration to calculate damages.73 By contrast to the jurisdictional
phase, investment tribunals tend to be more open to the double recovery concerns74 and have been known to award damages to
shareholders in proportion to the shareholders’ shares of equity.75
For shareholders seeking to bring a claim in investor-state arbitration, two questions become determinative. First, what constitutes an investment under a treaty and, in particular, do protected
investments under a treaty include stock or other interest in the
company? Second, who can bring a claim under an investor protection treaty? Answering these questions requires treaty interpretation by an arbitral tribunal and would ultimately determine
whether a tribunal has jurisdiction to hear a dispute involving a
particular investment activity or an investor.
Arbitral tribunals interpret treaties by giving the treaties’ terms
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 41, 45 (2014).
72
See CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 325 (2008)
(noting that there is “the tendency of tribunals to end the jurisdictional analysis
once they identify an entity with standing.”); see also CMS Gas Transmission v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 84, 86 (July 17, 2003) (finding Argentina’s argument that it is not necessarily true that CMS may claim compensation for Argentina’s actions proportionate to its share in TGN because it is not guaranteed that this compensation
would reach TGN’s shareholders was irrelevant for the jurisdiction).
73
See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS
456 (2009) (citing arbitral awards where the tribunals analyzed shareholding to
calculate damages).
74
See, e.g., Gemplus, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/3, Award, ¶¶ 12–60 (June 16, 2010) (explaining that shareholder
claimants insisted that their claim was “jurisdictionally distinct and wholly separate” from the company’s claim for damages in the host state’s domestic courts,
but the tribunal “[n]evertheless . . . appreciate[d] the concern that, in practical
terms, they may be seen as recovering compensation for the same acts through
separate sets of proceedings.”).
75
See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 620 (Mar. 14, 2003) (finding that an arbitral tribunal
awarded damages to the claimant in proportion to the claimant’s direct shareholding of 93.2% in the investment, but in awarding damages disregarded an additional share of 5.8% held indirectly by the claimant); see also Eskosol, supra note
9, ¶ 170 n.294 (“Had Italy instead not prevailed in the prior proceeding . . . the
Tribunal of course would have to be vigilant to prevent double recovery from Italy for the same loss. Because of the outcome of the Blusun case, however, that situation does not arise here.”).
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their ordinary meaning in view of the treaties’ respective object
and purpose.76 Yet, most investment treaties are inherently vague
and provide little or no clarification as to what constitutes an investment under the treaty. As a result, interpretations by arbitral
tribunals vary substantially across treaties and disputes. In the absence of the doctrine of stare decisis or binding precedents in international investment law, tribunals may also interpret identical treaty provisions differently in subsequent arbitrations.
2.2.1. Shareholding as investment
First-generation bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”)—the
most common form of IIAs—were relatively short. Such treaties
sought to increase inward investments and granted protection
largely to foreign direct investments (FDIs), which—by contrast to
two other categories of investments, portfolio and indirect investments—entail a lasting relationship with a certain degree of control
or influence over investments.77 BITs provided very little guidance
as to what constitutes an investment, leaving it to the arbitral tribunals to identify whether protection is warranted under a particular treaty. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States78 (the ICSID
76
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose”). For instance, arbitral tribunals have allowed
claims by both direct and indirect shareholders because BITs generally do not distinguish between direct and indirect investments. See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137
(Aug. 3, 2004) (“The Tribunal observes that there is no explicit reference to direct
or indirect investment as such in the [Treaty between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Argentine Republic concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investments]. The definition of ‘investment’ is very broad.”).
77
See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION MANUAL 99 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter IMF
POSITION MANUAL] (“Direct investment is related to control or a significant degree
of influence, and tends to be associated with a lasting relationship. As well as
funds, direct investors may supply additional contributions such as know-how,
technology, management, and marketing.”).
78
See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the Washington Convention), Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1290, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention] (establishing
the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and
providing facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states).
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Convention), adopted in 1965, offers largely a procedural mechanism of investor-state dispute resolution. The ICSID Convention
does not address the scope of protected investments and/or investors. Its only reference to investments is found in Article 25(1),
which limits the jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) to “any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment.”79 Therefore, the ICSID Convention
leaves it to sovereign states to specify in their treaties or investment
agreements what constitutes an investment with respect to which a
state agrees to arbitration under the ICSID Convention. Similarly,
there are no references to investments or investors in other arbitration rules commonly used in ISDS, such as the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.80
In this legal vacuum, scholars and arbitral tribunals sought to
establish certain criteria for distinguishing FDIs from other categories of investments. Notably, following the decision in Salini,81 tribunals incorporated the typical “features” identified by Schreuer
for investments under the ICSID Convention into the Convention’s
jurisdictional requirements.82 And so, in ICSID arbitrations, the
tribunals granted protection to investments that satisfied all of the
so-called Salini-Schreuer factors, which are: (a) a certain duration,
(b) a certain regularity of profit and return, (c) the assumption of
risk by both sides, (d) substantial commitment of capital, and (e)
significance of the operation for the host state’s development.83
Applied cumulatively, these stringent criteria provided little deference to the state parties’ own determination of what constituted an
Id. art. 25(1).
See generally UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES (2011),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arbrules-revised-2010-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TYK-F387].
81
Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001) (“The doctrine generally
considers that investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance
of the contract and a participation in the risks of the transaction . . . . In reading
the Convention’s preamble, one may add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment as an additional condition.”).
82
See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”: ICSID’s Travaux
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 257, 273
(2010) (explaining that arbitral tribunals have gone even further than Salini by
“requiring each of [Schreuer’s ‘typical features’ of investments] to be satisfied in
some objective measure, rather than allowing for some totality-of-thecircumstances balancing among the factors.”).
83
See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 140,
¶ 122 (2001) (defining “investment” based on ICSID’s history”).
79
80
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investment under the treaty. These criteria also limited protection
for portfolio investments,84 such as investments in equity and debt
securities, largely because portfolio investments do not provide an
investor with control over the company, unless the case involves a
controlling or a majority shareholder. Furthermore, beyond the
amounts invested in actual shares, portfolio investments generally
do not entail sharing of risk between an investor (a shareholder)
and a host state. Finally, such investments can be of a short duration, which does not warrant protection under the Salini-Schreuer
factors.85
The need to satisfy the Salini-Schreuer criteria has subsided over
time as the new generation of BITs have come into force. These
treaties have explicitly extended protection to portfolio investments
(such as stock and bonds) and indirect investments (such as agreements on technical assistance, intellectual property transfers, and
joint marketing arrangements).86 Today, most modern IIAs would
consider holding shares in companies that have made investments
abroad or being a foreign shareholder in the local companies established in the host state to be protected investment activities. A typical example is Article 1 of the U.S. Model BIT, which defines “investment” as:
[E]very asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or
indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, in84
See IMF POSITION MANUAL, supra note 77, at 99 (outlining the functional
categories of investment and distinguishing portfolio investors from direct investors). There are different dynamics at work in cases of portfolio investments as
compared to FDIs. As the IMF explains:

“[P]ortfolio investors typically have less of a role in the decision making
of the enterprise with potentially important implications for future flows
and for the volatility of the price and volume of positions. Portfolio investment differs from other investment in that it provides a direct way to
access financial markets, and thus it can provide liquidity and flexibility.
It is associated with financial markets and with their specialized service
providers, such as exchanges, dealers, and regulators.”
Id.
85
Investment treaties generally do not contain a minimum duration requirement for a foreign investment to receive protection under a treaty, although
the Salini tribunal suggested a 2-year threshold. See Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v.
Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 54
(July 23, 2001) (The transaction, therefore, complies with the minimal length of
time . . . which is from 2 to 5 years).
86 See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1–2 (defining three broad categories of
cross-border investments as commonly described in international investment
law).
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cluding such characteristics as the commitment of capital or
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.87
The article further provides a non-exclusive list of forms that an
investment may take, including: (a) an enterprise; (b) shares, stock,
and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; (c) bonds,
debentures, other debt instruments, and loans.88
Similar provisions that extend the benefits of investment treaties to shareholders can be found in the majority of known IIAs.
According to the Mapping Project of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), out of 2,577 IIAs included in the project, only 25 treaties exclude portfolio investments
from their coverage.89 Although the project does not yet cover all
known IIAs, one can clearly observe that the majority of modern
investment treaties specifically provide for—or at least do not exclude—protection of investments in the stock of the company.
2.2.2. Shareholder claims for reflective loss
Although many IIAs list shares as a type of investment, investment treaties generally do not talk about shares or shareholder
rights beyond that.90 In particular, investment treaties do not tend
to identify what kind of claims shareholders can bring in invest87
U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1
(2012),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PL8T-4ZQW].
88
See id. (providing definitions). The model treaty recognizes the diverse
nature of debt and attempts to distinguish debt that warrants investment protection from other types of debt. Footnote 1 to Article 1 explains that “[s]ome forms
of debt . . . are more likely to have the characteristics of an investment, while other
forms of debt, such as claims to payment that are immediately due and result
from the sale of goods or services, are less likely to have such characteristics.” Id.
n.1.
89
See generally UNCTAD, IIA Mapping Project, INV. POL’Y HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mappedContent
[https://perma.cc/PXJ5-ELYB] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). UNCTAD describes
its IIA Mapping Project as “a collaborative initiative between UNCTAD and universities worldwide to map the content of IIAs. The resulting database serves as a
tool to understand trends in IIA drafting, assess the prevalence of different policy
approaches and identify treaty examples.” Id.
90
See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 8 (“Typically, the only reference to
shares in BITs is a clause that clarifies that shares are assets that qualify as an investment under the treaty definition of investment.”).
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ment arbitration.91 Despite concise treaty provisions, tribunals
have consistently interpreted IIAs to allow shareholder claims for
reflective loss, and the number of such arbitrations continue to
grow.92 Gaukrodger has observed that “[c]laims by company
shareholders seeking damages from government for so-called ‘reflective loss’ now make up a substantial part of the [investor-state
dispute settlement] caseload.”93
Unlike domestic courts that focus on the type of loss suffered
by shareholders and prohibit shareholder claims if the loss is reflective of the company’s loss, arbitral tribunals focus their inquiry
on the availability of a cause of action for shareholders. Once they
are satisfied that a shareholder has been granted protection under
a treaty, they allow the case to proceed without regard to the type
of loss suffered by the shareholder. Having established liability,
tribunals award damages to shareholders directly, usually on a pro
rata basis to the company’s loss.94
Moreover, it is largely irrelevant for shareholder standing
whether a company can submit its claim in ISDS.95 The tribunals
view the claims by shareholders as autonomous from the claims by
the company and generally allow both types of claims to proceed.96
In this respect, tribunals have indicated that the interests of share91 See id. (noting that most treaties do not “expressly address the issue of the
scope of shareholder claims.”).
92 See id. at 7 (“A rough count suggests that there are easily more than 40 decisions involving shareholder claims and numerous pending cases, many of
which involve claims for reflective loss.”).
93 Id.
94 As Gaukrodger explains:

The consequence is three outcomes with regard to shareholder claims
that contrast with domestic law. First, shareholders have generally been
able to claim for reflective loss in ISDS whereas such shareholder claims
are generally barred in national law. Second, ISDS tribunals have awarded recovery of reflective loss to shareholders rather than to the company
as under domestic law shareholder derivative action procedures (which
exceptionally allow shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss, but
with recovery for the company). Third, ISDS tribunals have found shareholder claims for reflective loss to be autonomous from those of the
company in ISDS so that both claims can co-exist; this cannot occur under general domestic law principles.
Id. at 8.
95
Cf. id. at 29 (citing arbitrations where companies had recourse to claims in
ISDS, yet their shareholders were also allowed to proceed in arbitration).
96
See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 166 (“A shareholder’s claim for its reflective loss through an entity in which it holds shares cannot be equated automatically to that entity’s claim for its direct losses.”).
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holders and the company are rarely identical to the extent that it is
abusive to allow both arbitrations to proceed.97 For instance, interests of the shareholder and the company may be found to be identical where a foreign shareholder owns 100% of equity in a local
company.98
Provisions of BITs and other IIAs establish who may bring a
claim in arbitration with a focus on the nationality requirements.
As a general rule, the claimant must be a national of the State party
to the treaty and may not be a national of the host state.99 For instance, under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, a foreign investor can submit
a claim to arbitration on its own behalf (Article 1116), or on behalf
of an enterprise—a juridical person established in the host State
that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly (Article
1117).100 Article 1117(3) further provides that if claims are made
both on behalf of an investor and an enterprise and they arise from
the same events, such claims have to be generally heard together
by the arbitral tribunal.101 Thus, NAFTA Chapter 11 attempts to
achieve greater consistency and judicial economy by providing for
consolidation of arbitrations.
In addition, some treaties allow an investment to initiate an arbitration directly.102 Under most of these treaties, an “investment” is
a company that is incorporated in the host state to carry out in97 See id. ¶ 167 (noting that the interests of the shareholders and the company
can be identical such that it would be abusive to “permit arbitration of a given
dispute by one after the other already has concluded an arbitration over the same
dispute.”).
98 See id. (“In the Tribunal’s view, the same conclusion would be equally logical in the reverse situation, if a first case were brought by the 100% shareholders
of a local company and thereafter a second case was attempted by the local company that they wholly owned.”).
99
See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 2 (“The claimants in investment arbitration
must meet certain requirement with respect to their nationality. Most importantly, they must not be nationals of the host State.”).
100
See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1116–17,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992) [hereinafter NAFTA] (noting methods through
which investors can submit claims to arbitration).
101
See id. art. 1117(3) (“Where an investor makes a claim under this Article
and the investor or a non-controlling investor in the enterprise makes a claim under Article 1116 . . . the claims should be heard together by a Tribunal established
under Article 1126, unless the Tribunal finds that the interests of a disputing party
would be prejudiced thereby.”).
102
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Investor-State Disputes Arising from Investment Treaties: A Review, 15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4
(2005) (defining “investor” and “investment”). But see NAFTA, supra note 100,
art. 1117(4) (“An investment may not make a claim under this Section [B. Settlement of Disputes between a Party and an Investor of Another Party].”).
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vestment activity, as required by law or business considerations.103
Although these are local companies that are generally not expected
to benefit from investment treaties, they may be granted protections if such companies are under foreign control.104 Arbitral tribunals have interpreted these provisions with “some flexibility,”105
consistently allowing local companies under foreign control to act
as claimants, irrespective of any claims by the controlling shareholders.106
103
See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 620 (noting that where “the company has
the nationality of the host State and does not qualify as a foreign investor. . . . the
company in question is not treated as the investor but as the investment.”); id. at 4
(observing that “many States require the establishment of a local company as a
precondition for foreign investment.”); see also Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija,
S.A. v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 50 (July 3, 2002), 19 ICSID Rev. 89 (2004) (“While the foreign shareholding is by definition an ‘investment’ and its holder an ‘investor,’ the
local company only falls within the scope of Article 1 [of the France-Argentina
BIT] if it is ‘effectively controlled, directly or indirectly, by nationals of one Contracting Party’ or by corporations established under its laws.”). Sometimes, establishment of the local company is motivated purely by business considerations.
See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 49 (noting that where there was no requirement
under Italian law to establish a local company, but a foreign investor chose to do it
for business reasons).
104
Article 25(1)(b) of the ICSID Convention permits the host state and the
foreign investor to agree that a locally incorporated company should be treated as
a foreign company because of its foreign control. See ICSID Convention, supra
note 78, art. 25(2)(b) (providing in relevant part that “‘National of another Contracting State’ means: . . . any juridical person which had the nationality of the
Contracting State party to the dispute . . . and which, because of foreign control,
the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting
State for the purposes of this Convention.”); see also The Energy Charter Treaty
art. 26(7), Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter ECT] (providing in relevant
part that an investment “controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party . . .
[shall] be treated as a ‘national of another State.’”). Thus, provided there is
agreement between the parties, the foreign control requirement allows departure
from the principles of incorporation or seat of the company, which are commonly
applied under international investment law to determine the nationality of the
corporation. Cf. Schreuer, supra note 11, at 17 (“Under the ICSID Convention, departure from the principle of incorporation or siège social in favour of foreign control to determine corporate nationality is permissible only under the narrowly circumscribed conditions of Article 25(2)(b).”). Some tribunals may also apply the
equitable doctrine of “veil piercing” to identify the true nationality of the party.
See, e.g., Alexandrov, supra note 18, at 402 (opining that a tribunal could pierce the
veil only where the company’s conduct “constitute[s] an abuse of legal personality” and there is evidence that the company “used its formal legal nationality for
[an] improper purpose.” (citation omitted)).
105 Schreuer, supra note 11, at 5.
106
See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 15, 17 (Sept. 25, 1983) (asserting jurisdiction over claims against Indonesia by both PT Amco, a local Indonesian company,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

218

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

Furthermore, arbitral tribunals have allowed both direct and
indirect shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss. In doing
so, tribunals rely on investment treaty provisions, which are usually broad and do not distinguish between direct and indirect investments. Without an express exclusion of indirect shareholders,
arbitral tribunals have demonstrated certain reluctance to deny jurisdiction to indirect investments.107 As a result, it is increasingly
hard to predict if a tribunal will be willing to cut some of the potential claimants depending on a degree of remoteness from an investment.
The openness of ISDS to claims by indirect shareholders increases the multiplicity of claims in ISDS, especially because the
pool of potential claimants expands beyond a local company (an
“investment”) and its direct shareholders.108 The potential scenarios of how investments and claims can be structured are unlimited.
They can involve shareholders of one or more intermediaries in the
investor’s home state, the host state or third countries, at several
levels of corporate ownership structure.109 Arbitral tribunals have
and Amco Asia, its controlling shareholder).
107 See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 137 (Aug. 3, 2004) (denying Argentina’s objection to
jurisdiction arising from the claimant’s indirect shareholding in the Argentine investment because “there is no explicit reference to direct or indirect investment as
such in the [Germany-Argentina bilateral investment] Treaty. The definition of
‘investment’ is very broad . . . . Therefore, a literal reading of the Treaty does not
support the allegation [by Argentina] that the definition of investment excludes
indirect investment.”).
108
Schreuer, supra note 11, at 11 (observing that “[i]f there are two or more
layers of minority shareholding the economic consequence of the adverse action
by the host State may still be traceable. But the pursuit of legal remedies becomes
increasingly complex especially if competing sets of shareholders at different levels pursue parallel or conflicting remedies.”).
109
Schreuer points to a complex structure of investment in Enron v. Argentina, where the claimants indirectly owned 35.263% of the investments in Argentina. See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 12 (describing investment structure). The
shareholding was described as follows:
Claimants’ participation concerns the privatization of Transportadora de
Gas del Sur (“TGS”), one of the major networks for the transportation
and distribution of gas produced in the provinces of the South of Argentina. The Claimants own 50% of the shares of CIESA, an Argentine incorporated company that controls TGS by owning 55.30% of its shares;
the Claimants’ participation in CIESA is held by two wholly-owned
companies, EPCA and EACH. The Claimants, through EPCA, EACH
and ECIL, another corporation controlled by the Claimants, also own
75.93% of EDIDESCA, another Argentine corporation that owns 10% of
the shares of TGS; and they also have acquired an additional 0.02% of
TGS through EPCA. The investment as a whole, it is explained, amounts
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acknowledged the problem, but continue to grant jurisdiction as
long as a treaty allows shareholder protection without reservations.110
Consequently, reflective loss claims under international investment law largely raise the same concerns that motivated domestic courts to adopt the no reflective loss principle: double recovery, increased cost of litigation, and conflicting awards.111
Arbitral tribunals have acknowledged these concerns and expressed sympathy to the host states’ circumstances,112 yet they continue faithfully to enforce IIAs by permitting claims by shareholders independently of claims by local companies.113
to 35.263% of TGS.
Enron v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 21 (Jan. 14, 2004).
110
See, e.g., id. ¶ 50 (raising concern that “if minority shareholders can claim
independently from the affected corporation, this could trigger an endless chain
of claims, as any shareholder . . . could invoke a direct right of action for measures
affecting a corporation at the end of the chain.”); id. ¶ 52 (“The Tribunal notes that
. . . there is indeed a need to establish a cut-off point beyond which claims would
not be permissible as they would have only a remote connection to the affected
company.”). But see Schreuer, supra note 11, at 14 (criticizing the tribunal’s suggestion to find a cut-off, stating that “[t]he Tribunal’s demand for a cut-off point
for indirect shareholding lacks a legal foundation. Any difficulties arising from a
multiplicity of claimants can be taken care of by a number of devices but do not
require that the investor be deprived of its standing.”).
111
See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 9 (observing that “[s]hareholder
claims are likely to be less predictable for governments than claims by the injured
company because company nationality is both known and hard to change; in contrast, the identity of shareholders is both more likely to change and frequently
hard to monitor.”).
112
See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 170 (“The tribunal is not unsympathetic
to Italy’s circumstances . . . . [I]t would not be appropriate for tribunals to preclude arbitration by qualified investors, simply because other qualified investors
may have proceeded before them without their participation.”).
113 See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 249 (citing American Mfg. & Trading v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (Feb 21, 1997); Genin
v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 324 (June 25, 2001)) (discussing
cases where the protected foreign investments were shares in domestic companies); see also CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award (Sept. 13, 2001); Antoineé Goetz v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3, Decision (Sept. 2, 1998), 15 ICSID Rev. 457 (2000);
Emilio Augustín Maffezzini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 25, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 212 (2001); Compañía de
Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment (July 3, 2002); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 8, 2003);
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
of the Arbitral Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Apr. 30, 2004); Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulg., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Juris-
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By contrast to their treatment of the host states, arbitral tribunals have shown little sympathy to multinational corporations
whose shareholders submit reflective loss claims in ISDS. Most
tribunals focus on the enforcement of investment treaties and do
not discuss distortions that reflective loss claims create on corporate law and governance within the corporation.114 Arbitral tribunals have not been sensitive to these concerns and instead have accepted shareholder claims and established jurisdiction even where
it would harm the corporation—for instance, because it would destroy the management efforts to settle with a host state.115 Only a
few tribunals have acknowledged the problem, suggesting that
disputes between the shareholders and the company resulting
from their competing interests in investment arbitrations can be
addressed under domestic law.116 Other tribunals have dismissed
any concerns over competing interests between the company and
its treaty-protected shareholders, presumably leaving it for the
company and the shareholders to resolve their disputes between
themselves.
By contrast to domestic courts that focus on the nature of
shareholder loss and reject claims for reflective loss, investment
tribunals have focused on the cause of action. Once they establish
that a shareholder has the right to claim for reflective loss under a
treaty, tribunals establish jurisdiction regardless of the reflective
nature of the shareholder loss.117 Arbitral tribunals explain their
diction (Feb. 8, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 262 (2005).
114
See, e.g., Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01,
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 80 (Aug. 25, 2006) (“Having found, however, that the assets and rights that Total claims have been injured in breach of the
BIT fall under the definition of investments under the BIT, it is immaterial that
they belong to Argentine companies in accordance with the law of Argentina.”).
115
See ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS
456 (2009) (describing instances where tribunals “hearing claims by shareholders
have proclaimed as irrelevant the fact that the company is actively negotiating
with the host state to achieve a settlement.”).
116
See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 170 (holding that it was not a “sufficient
basis for precluding qualified investors from exercising their fundamental right to
access the ICSID system,” even where domestic law affords “potential remedies—
for example, claims by minority shareholders or bankruptcy receivers against majority shareholders who take unauthorized actions in contravention of domestic
law.”).
117
See, e.g., RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No.
V079/2005, Final Award, ¶ 608 (Sep. 12, 2010) (noting that “investment treaty arbitration does not require that a shareholder can only claim protection in respect
of measures that directly affect shares in their own right, but that the investor can
also claim protection for the effect on its shares by measures of the host state taken
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position by express provisions of investor protection treaties,
which permit shareholder claims for reflective loss irrespective of
the legal nature and status of foreign investors under domestic
law. Scholars have expressed their support to such arbitral tribunals’ practice.118 Considering the text of existing IIAs and decisions
by investment tribunals interpreting such treaties, one can clearly
observe that—in international investment law—concerns about
foreign investor protection prevail over concerns over double recovery, conflicting awards, and judicial economy, the justifications
for the “no reflective loss” principle under domestic law.119
3. REFLECTIVE LOSS AND CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
3.1. Theoretical predictions
Courts and commentators have suggested that the no reflective
loss principle under domestic corporate law is based on policy
considerations.120 In other words, domestic law does not provide
shareholders with the right to bring a claim for reflective loss not
because the law does not recognize shareholder’s injury, but because the law finds it more efficient and more fair to give a right to
claim for injury to the company.121 Most frequently, such policy
against the company.”).
118 See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE , & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES ¶¶ 6.77, 6.79
(2007) (“[T]here is no conceptual reason to prevent an investor recovering for
damage caused to those shares which has resulted in a diminution in their value .
. . . The simplest approach to justify claims [for reflective loss] is . . . based upon
the wording of the treaty.”).
119
Chaisse and Li have argued in this respect that “policy considerations
underlining the non-reflective loss principle that are developed by the domestic
courts should not be blindly adopted by international arbitration tribunals adjudicating investment treaty disputes.” Chaisse & Li, supra note 7, at 84. Instead, “the
tribunals should first analyze the policy considerations in the context of international investment and economic development.” Id.
120
See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 29 (quoting Waddington Ltd. v.
Chan Chun Hoo, [2008] 4 H.K.C. 381, § 49 (C.F.A.)) (noting that “the principle barring shareholder claims for reflective loss ‘is a matter of legal policy. It is not because the law does not recognise the loss as a real loss.’”); Johnson v. Gore Wood
& Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 (“The disallowance of the shareholder’s claim in respect of reflective loss is driven by policy considerations.”); Thomas v. D’Arcy,
2005 QCA 68 (Queensland Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he no reflective loss principle is
‘driven by policy considerations’.”).
121
See Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 8 (“The no reflective loss principle is
based on the view that limiting recovery to the company is both more efficient
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considerations include consistency, predictability, judicial economy, and avoidance of double recovery.122
The no reflective loss principle contributes to consistency and
predictability by prohibiting claims by shareholders, which makes
it easier for a wrongdoer to predict who will bring a claim for a
breach. This reduces the likelihood of multiple claims and, as a result, inconsistent and conflicting decisions arising out of the same
events. In doing so, the no reflective loss principle eliminates the
likelihood of double recovery by shareholders (both direct recovery and indirect recovery through a company) and reduces the
costs of litigation, thereby contributing to judicial economy. Separately, the no reflective loss principle is supported by fairness considerations because it is largely considered to be unfair to make a
party in litigation defend itself again in a separate litigation and
potentially pay twice for the same breach.
Regardless of the exact nature of policy considerations, domestic corporate laws across the globe are consistent today in prohibiting shareholder claims for reflective loss. Corporations bring direct claims for losses they sustain, without having to compete
against their own shareholders for potential damages. In this
world of the no reflective loss principle, a corporation and a
wrongdoer that litigate their dispute are merely the users of the
domestic court system. The rules of civil procedure the corporation relies on to bring its claim and achieve a dispute resolution, as
a general rule, do not impact the inner structure of the corporation
or its corporate governance choices.
The story is, however, very different in international investment law. There, shareholder claims for reflective loss are permitted and they penetrate the corporate shield, contributing to an inherent conflict of interests between the shareholders and the
company. A rational shareholder with the right to bring its own
claim for losses suffered by the corporation due to a breach of investor protection obligations will always bring such a claim in arbitration.123 These shareholder actions will interfere with the control
and fairer to all interested parties.”)
122
Id. at 11; see also Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1291 (“One rationale behind this prohibition [of shareholder claims for reflective loss] rests on
principles of judicial economy.”).
123 See DOUGLAS, supra note 115, at 452 (2009) (questioning “why a shareholder would elect to bring a claim for the account of its company if it had the option
of bypassing the company altogether. The company might be liable to pay creditors, local taxes and discharge other obligations before distributing the residual
amount of any damages recovered to the shareholders.”).
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and management decisions within the corporation, may harm the
company’s settlement and litigation efforts, and—even more troublesome for the corporate form—may directly benefit treatyprotected shareholders at the expense of the company, its creditors,
and all other stakeholders. For instance, without regard to the
management decision to settle a dispute with the host state in order to continue operations in the country, a treaty-protected shareholder can commence an arbitration seeking recovery of reflective
loss and consequently destroy any attempts by the company to settle. Moreover, once the treaty-protected shareholders win in arbitration against a host state, they can deplete corporate assets by
collecting damages otherwise owed to the company.
In theory, one can anticipate several areas of distortion created
by reflective loss claims on corporate law and governance, as well
as the structure of the corporate ownership chain of companies investing abroad. In its policy paper, the OECD has examined how
the rules on reflective loss claims can affect corporate governance
as well as the corporation and its stakeholders, including shareholders and creditors.124 The paper suggests that reflective loss
rules under investment treaties may undermine “entity shielding”125 by allowing a shareholder (a) “partially to liquidate the
company to the extent of their reflective loss” and (b) to “upset the
priority rule by giving covered shareholders . . . a priority right to
corporate assets over creditors.”126 From a firm’s perspective, such
changes to the corporate law and the incentives they create are particularly troublesome, in large part, because they deprive present
and potential creditors of the firm of common expectations as to
the corporate form and the effect of contracts entered between the
creditors and the corporation.127 This may impact the ability of and
the cost for the corporation to obtain future credit.128 On a broader
124
See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 234–46 (2016) (noting that rules
related to investment treaties may affect companies, shareholders, creditors, capital markets, and the corporate structuring of investment).
125
See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, & Richard Squire, Law and the
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2006) (introducing and defining the
term “entity shielding” as a form of asset partitioning which “protects firm assets
from the owners’ personal creditors (and from creditors of other business ventures), thus reserving those assets for the firm’s creditors.”).
126 OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 236.
127
See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (“Entity shielding doctrine . . . is
needed to create common expectations, among a firm and its various present and
potential creditors, concerning the effect that a contract between a firm and one of
its creditors will have one the security available to the firm’s other creditors.”).
128
See, e.g., Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 45 n.104 (noting that “[a] policy
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scale, as the OECD has suggested, this may affect the “corporate
personality” of the company, including its ability to “serve as a
single contracting party and make credible commitments, and its
ability to use its assets to obtain credit.”129 Undermining entity
shielding in the corporation has a significant impact on its creditors
and may injure creditors when shareholders recover damages,
thereby effectively stripping away corporate assets.130
While domestic courts have addressed the same questions of
partial liquidation of corporate assets and changes to the priority
rules, they have consistently protected the corporate form by applying the no reflective loss principle. For instance, in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
“a suit by an indirectly injured victim could be an attempt to circumvent the relative priority its claim would have in the directly
injured victim’s liquidation proceedings.”131 Similarly, the court in
Gaubert v. United States has explained that, “[w]ere common shareholders allowed to sue directly and individually for damages to the
value of their shares, we would be allowing them to bypass the
corporate structure and effectively preference themselves at the
expense of the other persons with a superior financial interest in
the corporation.”132 International arbitral tribunals have been blind
to the corporate law concerns, allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss that may lead to the distortions to the corporate law
and governance and, in effect, redistribute wealth from the corporation and its creditors to the treaty-protected shareholders.
The OECD has further observed that the rules on reflective loss
will affect shareholders differentially since only a subset of shareholders will be covered by a treaty and, within this subset, only
some shareholders will be likely to bring a claim (due to the high

that puts creditors of companies engaged in foreign investment at risk may affect
the availability and price of debt finance for foreign investment.”).
129 OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 237.
130 See id. at 239–40 (explaining that shareholder claims for reflective loss can
hurt creditors); Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 44 (“[A]llowing that shareholders
claims for reflective loss can injure creditors of the company (unless the defendant
is forced to pay the same damages twice).”); see also KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note
2, at 2 (explaining that conflicts between shareholders and the corporation’s other
constituencies, including creditors, are one of the three principal agency conflicts
that are addressed by corporate law).
131 Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992).
132
Gaubert v. United States, 885 F.2d 1284, 1291 (5th Cir. 1989), rev’d, 499
U.S. 315 (1991) (footnote omitted).
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cost of investment arbitration).133 This differential treatment may
provide incentives to some shareholders to restructure to benefit
from a stronger investor protection regime.134 In addition, the right
to submit a claim for reflective loss in investment arbitration provides leverage to treaty-protected shareholders in their negotiations with the management on various important corporate issues,
including arbitration and settlement strategy.135 Furthermore,
shareholder claims for reflective loss may impact the centralized
management of the corporation by the board of directors, who are
generally vested with making business decisions. Instead, the
rules on reflective loss allow shareholders to individually make
important decisions on “key issues of corporate interest,” such as
whether to commence an investment arbitration.136 In addition, the
OECD has suggested that the rules on reflective loss claims may
interfere and have adverse effect on the transferability and liquidity of shares, although the impact of these rules on such issues is
currently unclear.137
One can add to the OECD’s impact list a further impact area,
which Lord Millett identified in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. with respect to domestic claims for reflective loss.138 Lord Millett argued
that allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss would create a
conflict of interest for directors who are also shareholders of the
company and, in this latter capacity, likely interested in bringing a
personal suit, thereby undermining the company’s efforts to settle.139 The same concern is valid in the context of international investment law, where there are high damages at stake resulting
from failed investment projects abroad. Allowing reflective loss
claims creates a conflict of interest for shareholders who are also
directors. As in domestic corporate law, these shareholders would
133
See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 237–38 (noting that in view of
the high costs of ISDS provisions of investment treaties are likely to divide shareholders into separate groups, or subsets, including shareholders that are not covered by a treaty and shareholders that are unlikely to bring claims).
134 See id.
135 See id.
136 See id. at 244.
137 See id. at 238–39 (explaining how share transferability and liquidity can be
adversely affected).
138
See generally Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) at 66 (discussing reflective loss).
139
See id. (“[I]f the company’s action were brought by its directors [who are
also shareholders], they would be placed in a position where their interest conflicted with their duty . . . .”).
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likely be interested in bringing personal claims instead of making
decisions in their director’s capacity for the benefit of the corporation.
In addition to creating a conflict of interest for some shareholders, reflective loss claims create a problem of shareholder inequality. They provide additional rights to treaty-protected shareholders
that other shareholders of the same corporation do not have, even
though they might have paid the same price for the shares. These
rights—including the rights to bring a claim in arbitration, to decide on a strategy in arbitration and/or whether to settle, and to
collect damages awarded in arbitration—give treaty-protected
shareholders the upper hand in their negotiations with corporate
management once an investment dispute arises.
Apart from the impact on corporate governance, shareholder
claims for reflective loss may contribute to forum- and treatyshopping. International investment law provides incentives to the
corporation to restructure to benefit from a more beneficial investor protection regime. The reflective loss claims increase the likelihood and complexity of restructuring within the corporate ownership chain because, in addition to incentives to the company, it
provides incentives to the shareholders to acquire more beneficial
protection for present or potential reflective loss claims.
With these predictions in mind, let us examine the practice of
arbitral tribunals with a view of studying the impact of shareholder claims on corporate law and governance, as well as on structuring of the multinational corporations that have chosen to invest
abroad. I will discuss two categories of cases: disputes that illustrate the impact of reflective loss claims on (1) corporate governance, and (2) the structure of the corporations.
3.2. Empirical evidence and case studies
3.2.1. Reflective loss and corporate governance
One of the most recent cases that reflects the essence of the
problem of reflective loss claims is the Eskosol arbitration.140 The
facts of this case deserve closer attention. The dispute in Eskosol
emerged from a regulatory change in the Italian renewable energy
sector that led to the abandonment of photovoltaic (PV) project by
140
See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 122 (adjudicating on and discussing the core
problem of reflective loss claims).
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a foreign investor and a bankruptcy of a locally-incorporated Italian company, Eskosol. The case demonstrates how claims by treaty-protected shareholders can conflict with the interests of the
company and its creditors, especially if the company is in financial
distress and would benefit from submitting its own claim and collecting damages awarded to the shareholder. The Eskosol arbitration is the second arbitration resulting from the same facts in a dispute with Italy.141 It follows an ICSID arbitration under the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT) brought by Eskosol’s majority shareholder—
Blusun S.A.—and two individuals who owned Blusun.142 Italy
prevailed in the Blusun arbitration but is currently facing an ICSID
annulment proceeding.143
Eskosol was constituted in Italy in 2009 as a limited liability
company (S.r.l.), but was later transformed into an Italian joint
stock company (S.p.A.).144 Eskosol was established by its shareholders—a Belgian company Blusun (which originally held a 50%
equity stake in Eskosol, but over time increased its equity to 80%)
and four Italian nationals (by the time of the dispute only two of
them remained shareholders, each holding a 10% equity).145 In its
turn, Blusun was owned by two individuals—a French citizen and
a German citizen.146
As a project company, Eskosol was to develop, build, and connect to the national power grid a number of solar PV power plants
in Italy. Eskosol allegedly invested €38.5 million to the planning,
construction, and operation of its solar energy generation project
comprising of 120 solar PV power plants.147 Between May and July
2010, Eskosol acquired 100% shareholding in 12 special purpose
vehicle companies (SPVs), thus receiving access to all permits,
141
Id. (noting that “Italy argue[d] that ‘the dispute’ . . . already has been
submitted to arbitration in the Blusun case.”).
142 See generally Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Final Award (Dec. 27, 2016) [hereinafter
Blusun].
143 See generally Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3, Application for Annulment (May 2, 2017).
144
See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶20 (indicating that Eskosol was established on
December 21, 2009, as a limited liability partnership).
145 Id. ¶¶ 20–21 (describing how Eskosol was established).
146
Id. ¶ 20 (“Blusun in turn was owned by two individuals, Messrs. JeanPierre Lecorcier, a French citizen, and Michael Stein, a German citizen.”).
147
Id. ¶ 23 (“The Claimant alleges that it made a number of investments in
relation to the development of a solar energy generation project in Italy comprising 120 solar PV power plants. Eskosol allegedly devoted approximately €38.5
million to the planning, construction and operation of the plants.”).
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rights, entitlements, and infrastructure necessary to bring its plants
into operation within eighteen months. Eskosol also began work
on the installation of a 150- to 180-kilometer private network of cables to connect each plant to dedicated substations. In December
2010, it entered into an agreement with Siemens S.p.A. for the construction and commissioning of the plants.148
At the time when Eskosol was created, Italy had in place a
feed-in tariffs (FITs) program that guaranteed fixed payments to
qualifying photovoltaic (PV) power plants that generated energy
from renewable sources. The Italian government subsequently
adopted two regulatory measures—the “Romani decree” and the
“Conto Energia IV”—which reduced the FITs, making Eskosol’s
projects economically unviable.149 Eskosol alleges in the ICSID arbitration that these changes in the FIT program have forced it to
abandon its PV projects and led to Eskosol’s inability to pay its
debts. As a result, it argues, Eskosol was declared insolvent and
placed under receivership in November 2013.150
Soon thereafter, on February 21, 2014, the majority shareholder
of Eskosol—Belgian company Blusun and its owners—began an
ICSID arbitration challenging regulatory measures by the Italian
government. The Blusun claimants sought recovery of the “loss of
investment made and to the capital gains that the Claimants were
unable to realize on their investments,” in an amount estimated to
be €187.8 million.151 Eskosol’s claims arise directly out of the losses
that it suffered as the operating company.152 According to Eskosol,
Blusun initiated and litigated the ICSID arbitration without consulting Eskosol, attempting to “usurp Eskosol’s claims and seek
compensation for its direct losses.”153 Furthermore, Eskosol alleges
that claimants in the Blusun arbitration have not cooperated with

148
Id. ¶ 24 (“On December 29, 2010, Eskosol entered into an engineering,
construction and procurement agreement . . . with Siemens S.p.A . . . for the construction and commissioning of the plants.”).
149 Id. ¶¶ 25–26.
150
See id. ¶ 27 (“The Claimant asserts that the Eskosol Project became economically unviable as a result of these measures, and Eskosol had no alternative
but to abandon its project.”).
151 Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 48.
152
See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 161 (“In its view, the excerpts suggests [sic]
that Blusun sought recovery for lost ‘capital gains’ benefits it could have secured
by selling its shareholding in Eskosol, while Eskosol’s claims arise directly out of
the losses that it suffered as the operating company.”).
153 Id. ¶ 151.
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Eskosol’s insolvency proceedings.154 With the Blusun arbitration
then pending, on December 9, 2015, Eskosol filed its own request
for ICSID arbitration under the ECT against Italy.155
Aware of the Blusun arbitration that derived largely from the
same facts as its own arbitration, Eskosol states that it attempted to
consolidate the two arbitrations, but its request to consolidate was
denied by the Blusun tribunal.156 Eskosol further sought permission to intervene in the Blusun arbitration proceedings by submitting its observations as a non-disputing party under ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2).157 In its application, Eskosol argued that claims by
Blusun and its owners were of an “abusive nature” and, in particular, that the Blusun claimants were “attempting to abuse these [arbitral] proceedings by seeking damages to which only Eskosol is
entitled.”158 It also disputed that awarding damages to Blusun and
its owners would prejudice Eskosol, its creditors, and its minority
shareholders.159 In addition, Eskosol raised concerns that “the
Blusun claimants ‘have no authority to represent Eskosol’s interests’ in the Blusun case, but nonetheless were attempting to obtain
compensation ‘for all of Eskosol’s losses . . . without the intent to
channel these moneys into Eskosol so Eskosol can reimburse any
such payments to the Eskosol Creditors.”160 The arbitral tribunal
denied Eskosol’s application to submit observations as a nonparty.161 The tribunal indicated that the non-party submission
could disrupt the arbitral proceeding as it was submitted “extraor-

154
See id. ¶ 29 (“Eskosol further asserts that the Blusun claimants have not
cooperated with Eskosol’s insolvency proceedings.”).
155 Id. ¶ 30 (“When Eskosol filed its Request in this case on December 9, 2015,
it acknowledged the pendency of the Blusun case, but stated that ‘[t]he present
claim is distinct and separate from that being pursued’ by the Blusun claimants.”
(citation omitted)).
156 See id. (noting that the Blusun tribunal denied Eskosol’s request to consolidate). It is unclear who proposed to consolidate the two arbitrations. In the
Blusun case, Italy claimed that it proposed to Blusun and Eskosol to consolidate
their two cases, but they refused. See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (recalling Italy’s
consolidation proposal to Blusun and Eskosol as a ground to deny Eskosol’s request to intervene as a non-disputing party in the Blusun case).
157
See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶¶ 42–43 (rejecting Eskosol’s application to
intervene).
158 See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 31 (quoting Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 5).
159 See id. (reciting Eskosol’s application to intervene in the Blusun case).
160 Id.
161
See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (explaining how the tribunal rejected the
party’s application).
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dinarily late” and there was no excuse for such lateness.162
In the Eskosol arbitration, on November 18, 2016, Italy attempted to secure a summary dismissal of Eskosol‘s case by filing an Objection under Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules arguing
that the claims were manifestly without legal merit.163 Soon thereafter, on December 27, 2016, Blusun lost its arbitration on the merits.164 This allowed Italy to add res judicata (and collateral estoppel) arguments to its Objection, arguing that the Blusun award has
preclusive effect on the dispute between Eskosol and Italy.165 As a
result, Italy presented four separate grounds for its application under Rule 41(5).166 In particular, Italy argued that Eskosol was no
longer a foreign investor because it was not under “foreign control” by Blusun, as required by the ECT to establish jurisdiction.
Italy further argued that Eskosol was under the control of a bankruptcy receiver and an Italian bankruptcy court.167 In light of the
Blusun arbitration, Italy also argued that under Article 26(3)(b)(i)
and Annex ID of the ECT Treaty, Italy did not give its unconditional consent to arbitration because an investor has previously
submitted the dispute to resolution in the Blusun arbitration.168
Separately, Italy argued that public international law principles
“preclude the opening of a new proceeding on a dispute that previously was submitted to another international arbitration tribunal
(lis pendens), or actually was decided by such a tribunal (res judicata
or collateral estoppel).”169 According to Italy, the Blusun arbitra162
Id. By the time Eskosol submitted its request to intervene as a nondisputing party, the hearings on jurisdiction and the merits in the arbitral proceedings in the Blusun case were held. See id. ¶¶ 33, 42 (noting that the hearings
were held in April 2016, while ICSID received Eskosol’s application to intervene
in June 2016). Hence, the tribunal noted that Eskosol’s submission was made very
late, even though Eskosol knew about the Blusun arbitration and could have made
its submission earlier in the arbitral proceedings. See id. ¶ 43 (“The Tribunal also
notes that Eskosol’s Application was submitted extraordinarily late and that there
is no excuse for the lateness.”).
163 See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 13 (stating that Italy filed an objection).
164
See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 423 (dismissing the entirety of Blusun’s
claims on the merits).
165
See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶¶ 136–37, 148 (reciting Italy’s res judicata defense).
166
See id. ¶ 43 (“Italy presents four separate grounds for its application that
the Tribunal dismiss Eskosol’s claims for manifest lack of legal merit . . . .”).
167 See id. ¶ 59 (explaining Eskosol’s bankruptcy proceedings).
168
See id. ¶ 121–24 (reciting Italy’s argument that its “consent [to ISDS] provided in the ECT did not extend to the initiation of a new arbitration proceeding
involving . . . ‘perfect identity of object and cause’ with the prior Blusun case.”).
169 Id. ¶ 136. (footnotes omitted).
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tion was a “parallel proceeding[] with perfect identity of object and
cause.”170
On its side, Eskosol argued that there was no legal basis to deprive Eskosol of its legal right, since Eskosol and Blusun were not
substantially the same claimants. It further argued that Blusun
was not authorized to present Eskosol in the first arbitration; to the
contrary, Blusun and its owners (1) failed to consult with Eskosol
in making a decision to bring an ICSID arbitration and (2) failed to
communicate with Eskosol during the course of their arbitration,
(3) refused to consider a consolidation of two arbitrations, (4) did
not represent the interests of Eskosol, including its minority shareholders and creditors, and (5) had “no intention of sharing any
proceeds with Eskosol to make it whole.”171
The tribunal was unconvinced with Italy’s arguments raised in
the Rule 41(5) objection. It denied Italy’s application for dismissal
of Eskosol’s claims on the grounds that they are “manifestly without legal merit,” pursuant to Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration
Rules.172 The Eskosol case is currently pending, and it remains to
be seen what consequences the Blusun award will have on the tribunal’s decision in the Eskosol arbitration.
The Italian objection under Rule 41(5) and its outcome underline the problem of reflective loss claims. Having failed to secure a
summary dismissal, Italy is forced to defend itself in the second
proceeding against claims derived from the same facts and, in doing so, to spend substantial financial resources on its defense.173
Moreover, having won against Eskosol’s majority shareholder
Blusun and Blusun’s owners, it is now forced to defend against
Eskosol. Ironically, the ability of Eskosol as an Italian company to
bring a claim in arbitration is based on the fact that the company is
Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 156 (footnote omitted).
172 Id. ¶ 173.
173 A host state’s average legal defenses costs are $4.5 million in legal fees in
addition to about $373,200 in tribunal costs (if tribunal costs are split equally between parties). See Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Cost of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Mar. 24, 2014) (describing an Allen & Overy study of
176 investment treaty arbitration cases). Another study of 138 ICSID arbitrations
concluded in the period of July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2015, revealed higher costs of,
on average, $5,619,261.74 for claimants and $4,954,461.27 for respondents, in addition to $882,668.19 in tribunal costs. See generally Jeffery P. Commission, How
Much Does an ICSID Arbitration Cost? A Snapshot of the Last Five Years, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/02/29/how-muchdoes-an-icsid-arbitration-cost-a-snapshot-of-the-last-five-years/
[https://perma.cc/D3NB-6P4Q].
170
171
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majority owned and controlled by Blusun, whose claims were denied in the Blusun arbitration.174 The Eskosol arbitration thus gives
Blusun a second chance to argue its case, although indirectly
through Eskosol.175 Given the circumstances of the Eskosol case,
Blusun is unlikely to benefit from any damages awarded to Eskosol, as Eskosol is currently in a bankruptcy proceeding. But considering that the damages might help Eskosol to pay its creditors
and emerge from bankruptcy as a viable company, Blusun might
benefit without collecting monetary damages directly. Generally
speaking, one can anticipate that where a company is financially
stable and brings its claims in arbitration following an arbitration
lost by its shareholder, a second arbitration would effectively provide the shareholder with the so-called second bite at the apple
and may benefit such shareholders indirectly.
From Eskosol’s perspective, the Blusun arbitration—although it
was lost by Blusun—creates concerns of the res judicata effect of
the Blusun award. Under the circumstances of the case, Blusun
commenced its arbitration without coordinating with Eskosol or
taking into account the company’s interest. Furthermore, the
Blusun tribunal did not take into account Eskosol’s interests
through either consolidation, or submissions by a non-party. As a
result, Eskosol’s interests were not presented in the Blusun arbitration, yet the outcome of the Blusun arbitration might have a preclusive effect on the Eskosol decision due to res judicata.
Deciding on Italy’s Objection under Rule 41(5), the tribunal did
not grant the Blusun award res judicata effect, mainly because Italy
was bound by a confidentiality agreement with Blusun and could
not provide the tribunal with a copy of the Blusun award to make
174
In the Eskosol arbitration, Eskosol brought claims against Italy under the
ECT. Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 1 (“This case concerns a dispute submitted to the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes . . . on the basis of the
Energy Charter Treaty.”). Under Article 26(7) of the ECT, a company that has a
nationality of the host state, but is controlled by investors of another state, is treated as a national of the other state. See ECT, supra note 104, art. 26(7) (“An Investor
which . . . is controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party, shall for the
purpose of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention be treated as a ‘national of another Contracting State’.”). Consequently, although an Italian company, Eskosol
is treated as a Belgian company for purposes of the ICSID Convention.
175
The circumstances of this case show that Eskosol is in bankruptcy and
that its ICSID arbitration was commenced on Eskosol’s behalf by the bankruptcy
receiver. See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 27 (“Eskosol’s bankruptcy receiver is Mr. Teodoro Contardi, who has the power to institute proceedings on behalf of Eskosol,
as a matter of Italian law.”). But circumstances may vary and in other instances
shareholders can benefit from the follow-up arbitrations by the company, effectively rearguing the case after shareholders’ loss in a prior arbitration.
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an assessment of whether the two cases were largely identical.176
However, in the future proceeding the tribunal can still grant the
Blusun award res judicata effect.177 An indicator of this is the fact
that the tribunal ordered Italy to submit a copy of the Blusun
award in the Eskosol arbitration.178 ICSID has since published the
Blusun award and it remains to be seen if and how the Eskosol arbitration will be affected by the Blusun award.
From the corporate governance perspective, the Blusun case
demonstrates how shareholder claims for reflective loss can actualize conflicts of interests between shareholders and “their” companies. Instead of just being a theoretical concern and a possible
cause of tension at the shareholder meetings, reflective loss claims
allow shareholders to directly oppose the company and its management. They give shareholders a right to bypass corporate governance choices and benefit directly by collecting damages for losses suffered by the corporation due to a breach of investor
protection obligations. Moreover, even if a treaty-protected shareholder loses in its arbitration, it can destroy the company’s ability
to seek damages for breaches of investor protection obligations
through res judicata.
Two additional observations can be made with regards to the
Eskosol case. First, there is an inherent conflict of interest between
the shareholders and the management of the corporation. Granting the right to bring a claim in arbitration to shareholders provides shareholders with a means to bypass the corporate management and control structure of the company and submit a claim to
arbitration disregarding the company’s interests. In the Eskosol
case, the company actively sought but failed to reach an agreement
with Blusun, which chose to submit its own claims to arbitration in
the hope it could benefit directly. Second, various procedural
mechanisms—such as claim consolidation and submission of nonparty observations—that would theoretically allow coordination
between the company’s and the shareholders’ interests may not
176
See id. ¶ 32 n.35 (“Italy contends that it is restricted by confidentiality obligations agreed in the Blusun case from submitting the full Award to this Tribunal.”).
177 See id. ¶ 172 (inviting Italy to invoke the Blusun award later in the case, by
stating that “Italy is free later in this case to argue, if it so wishes, that the conclusions of the Blusun tribunal were persuasive and should be followed by this Tribunal, exercising its independent judgment.”).
178
See id. ¶ 173 “[T]he Tribunal . . . . [o]rders Italy, to the extent and at such
time as it wishes to rely on the Blusun award for any purpose in this case, to produce such award in full.”).
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always work for various reasons. For instance, the applicable arbitration rules might not provide for consolidation,179 or either the
parties or the arbitral tribunal might not agree on consolidation.
Similarly, non-party submissions could not be allowed by the tribunal or the parties, for instance, where such submissions interfere
with the arbitral proceedings.180
3.2.2. Reflective loss and corporate structure
Critics of the ISDS system often suspect corporate claimants of
treaty- and forum-shopping, alleging that multinational corporations restructure solely to benefit from a stronger investor protection regime.181 There are no definite studies uncovering why companies investing abroad restructure and, for shareholders in
particular, what role reflective loss claims play in corporate restructuring.182 However, there are cases that suggest that reflective
loss claims contribute to treaty- and forum-shopping through corporate restructuring.
In Mobil Corporation v. Venezuela, in the midst of changes to the
regulatory regime of the Venezuelan petroleum industry, the
claimants created a new private company under the laws of the
Netherlands that was wholly owned by Mobil, a Delaware corporation.183 Within a year, the Dutch company acquired all shares in
179
For instance, the ICSID Convention and Arbitration rules do not provide
for consolidation specifically. See generally, ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), in ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES
(2006),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_Englishfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH6K-45QY].
180 For instance, the Blusun tribunal has refused the non-party submission by
Eskosol because the tribunal thought the submission was too late and could interfere with the arbitral proceedings. See Blusun, supra note 142, ¶ 43 (explaining
how the tribunal rejected the party’s application).
181
Similarly, host states have argued that institution by the “same substantial investor” of two parallel proceedings before two different tribunals amounts
to forum-shopping and should be prohibited as such. See, e.g., Eskosol, supra note
9, ¶ 127 (reciting Italy’s argument equating multiple related proceedings to prohibitive forum shopping).
182 See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 244 (noting the lack of any studies showing companies disbursing shareholders across jurisdictions to obtain the
benefits of a larger number of investment treaties).
183
See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶ 20 (“[T]he claimants in October
2005 created a new entity under the laws of the Netherlands, Venezuela Holdings,
and inserted it into the corporate chains for the Cerro Negro and La Ceiba Projects
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two Delaware companies indirectly involved in the Venezuelan oil
projects through two Bahamian companies.184 Having thus inserted a Dutch holding company into the corporate chain of ownership, the claimants filed for arbitration on September 6, 2007—less
than a year after the second acquisition—under the DutchVenezuelan BIT.185 It should be noted that as of today—nearly a
decade later—neither the United States nor the Bahamas has a BIT
with Venezuela. Without its newly created Dutch company, Mobil
would not have been able to claim protection under an investment
treaty. The tribunal in this case focused on the timing of the restructuring. It distinguished between pre-existing and future disputes and established jurisdiction only with respect to disputes
that arose after the respective dates of acquisition of two Delaware
companies by the Dutch entity.186 In doing so, the tribunal concluded that both Delaware subsidiaries of the Dutch company
were to be considered as nationals of the Netherlands because of
their control by the Dutch entity. No actual control had to be established as it was presumed that the Dutch company could exercise control because it owned 100% shares of both Delaware subsidiaries, which in turn wholly owned the Bahamian companies
and the investment.187 Perhaps not surprisingly, while the arbitration was ongoing, Venezuela submitted a notice of unilateral termination of its BIT with the Netherlands in April 2008.188
in February 2006 and November 2006 respectively.”).
184
See id. ¶¶ 21–22 (“Mobil (Delaware) owns 100% of Venezuela Holdings
(Netherlands), which owns 100% of Mobil CN Holding (Delaware)” and “100 %
of Mobil Venezolana (Bahamas), which finally owns a 50 % interest in the La Ceiba Association.”).
185 See id. ¶ 1 (describing request for arbitration).
186 See id. ¶ 206 (limiting the tribunal’s jurisdiction to only those disputes that
arose after the Dutch company acquired the Delaware and Bahamian companies).
187 See id. ¶ 160 (ruling that holding 100% of the subsidiary share capital was
enough to establish control under the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT).
188 See Luke Eric Peterson, Venezuela Surprises the Netherlands with Termination
Notice for BIT; Treaty Has Been Used by Many Investors to “Route” Investments into
ARB.
REP.
(May
16,
2008),
Venezuela,
INV.
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/venezuela-surprises-the-netherlands-withtermination-notice-for-bit-treaty-has-been-used-by-many-investors-to-routeinvestments-into-venezuela/ [https://perma.cc/MZX5-LRMZ] (discussing Venezuela’s termination notice to the Netherlands in April 2008); see also The Importance
of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) When Investing in Emerging Markets, A.B.A.
(June
29,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/03
/01_sprenger/[https://perma.cc/6KLV-QZUP] (stating that the official termination occurred on November 1, 2008).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

236

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

Some cases of corporate restructuring are blatantly fraudulent,
and tribunals have no difficulty recognizing this. In Phoenix v.
Czech Republic, a former Czech national incorporated an Israeli
company, forced it to acquire an interest in the Czech companies
owned by members of his family and already involved in the litigation with the Czech authorities, and then filed for an arbitration
under the Czech-Israeli BIT.189 Having examined the timing of the
investment and the nature and substance of the transaction, the arbitral tribunal established that the “Claimant’s initiation and pursuit of [the] arbitration [was] an abuse of the system of international ICSID investment arbitration” and accordingly found that it
lacked jurisdiction.190
In Tidewater v. Venezuela, the claimants conducted their operations in Venezuela through Tidewater Marine Service, C.A.
(“SEMARCA”), a company incorporated in Venezuela and owned
by another Venezuelan company—Tidewater Caribe.191 Tidewater
Caribe was owned by a company in the Cayman Islands, which
was in turn owned by Tidewater, Inc. (a U.S. corporation).192
Through SEMARCA, the claimants provided marine support services to the oil industry in Venezuela under commercial contracts
with certain Venezuelan national and semi-national oil companies.193 In 2008–2009, once oil prices fell, the Venezuelan national
oil companies struggled to pay for services under the contracts
with SEMARCA.194 As the arrears grew, SEMARCA continued
providing services but ultimately halted its performance and refused to extend its contracts until the arrears were reduced.195
While the contractual dispute was developing, Tidewater, Inc. created a new corporation in Barbados—Tidewater Barbados—and
189
See generally Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/5, Award (Apr. 15, 2009).
190 Id. ¶ 144.
191
See Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Caribe, C.A. v. Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶
2–3 (Feb. 8, 2013) (describing the dispute).
192 See id. ¶ 3 (describing the corporate ownership structure of the local Venezuelan investment).
193
See id. ¶¶ 2, 5 (noting that Venezuelan national oil company PDVSA engaged SEMARCA for oil industry support services).
194
See ¶¶ 154–64 (describing contractual dispute between SEMARCA and
PDVSA).
195
See id. ¶ 169 (“On 6 April 2009, Mr Jacob wrote to PDVSA to say that
SEMARCA would not continue to provide services to PDVSA after the expiration
of the two contracts due to expire on 31 May 2009 unless the arrears were reduced.”).
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transferred to it all the shares of Tidewater Caribe.196 Tidewater
Barbados was thus inserted into the claimants’ chain of corporate
ownership, becoming the sole owner of Tidewater Caribe.
About two months after the creation of the Barbados company,
Venezuela seized the claimants’ operations and assets in Venezuela, including fifteen vessels, driven in particular by concerns that
“the service companies might remove their vessels from Venezuela” and as a “response to contractors refusing to lower their rates
by at least 40%.”197 On 16 February 2010, the claimants filed a request for arbitration under the ICSID Convention invoking the
Barbados-Venezuela BIT. The request for arbitration was amended
on March 1, 2013 following the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction
of February 8, 2013.
In the arbitration, Venezuela objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, arguing that the claimant’s restructuring constituted an abuse
of right under international law.198 The claimants through its expert witness effectively acknowledged that the “restructuring was
motivated by both tax considerations and also by ‘risk mitigation
perspectives.’”199 The tribunal found that there was no abuse of
the treaty by the claimants. It accepted the claimant’s argument
that it thought to protect itself from a risk of expropriation, but only with respect to the general risk of future disputes.200 Having
then distinguished between the pre-existing contractual dispute
and the expropriation dispute, and found that the acts of expropriation were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the restructuring, the tribunal established jurisdiction only with respect to the
expropriation claims.201
Finally, in the infamous Philip Morris v. Australia case, the tri196
See id. ¶ 166 (“The formal steps for the incorporation of Tidewater Barbados and its acquisition of the shares of Tidewater Caribe were taken in Barbados
and Venezuela from 25 February to 9 March 2009 . . . .”).
197 Id. ¶¶ 174, 177.
198 See id. ¶ 48 (describing Venezuela’s claim of lack of jurisdiction).
199 Id. ¶ 183 (footnote omitted).
200
See id. ¶ 184 (“[I]t is a perfectly legitimate goal, and no abuse an investment protection treaty regime, for an investor to seek to protect itself from the
general risk of future disputes with a host state in this way. But the same is not
the case in relation to pre-existing disputes between the specific investor and the
state.”).
201
See id. ¶ 194 (holding Venezuela’s threat to withhold service agreement
payments were contractual and not an act of expropriation); id. ¶¶ 197–99 (holding Venezuelan acts of expropriation were not foreseeable during the corporate
restructuring).
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bunal notably declined jurisdiction because Philip Morris was not
“able to prove that tax or other business reasons were determinative for the restructuring [which lead the tribunal to] conclude that
the main and determinative, if not sole, reason for the restructuring
was the intention to bring a claim under the [Hong Kong-Australia
BIT].”202
The above cases illustrate that the companies and their shareholders sometimes restructure solely to acquire the benefits of a
stronger investor protection regime with respect to imminent or
potential investment disputes. The reflective loss claims available
to shareholders have arguably contributed to the dynamics of these
restructuring efforts by providing incentives to restructure not only to the local company and its direct shareholders, but also to indirect shareholders at the higher levels of the corporate ownership
chain. The challenge for the tribunals in these cases is to distinguish instances of restructuring that are motivated by genuine
business or tax considerations from opportunistic actions by the
management that seek to exploit the ISDS system and may hurt the
company. In a separate and forthcoming article, I will examine the
role of investment treaties and disputes, including the rules on reflective loss claims, in the restructuring of the multinational corporations and their corporate ownership chains.
3.3. Lessons for the law and public policy
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, investment arbitration cases provide evidence that shareholder claims for reflective
loss impact corporate law, its governance, and the corporate ownership structure of companies investing abroad. The case studies
offer several lessons for the law and public policy. First, the impact
of investment treaties on attracting foreign investments might be
less significant than expected,203 because companies may establish
202 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA
Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 584 (Dec. 17, 2015).
203
Prior studies on the impact of investor protection treaties on attracting
foreign investment are inconclusive. One of the recent studies has demonstrated
that there might be benefits of BITs for lower- and middle-income countries, but
not to high-income countries, although there are observable differences among
world regions. See, e.g., Arjan Lejour & Maria Salfi, The Regional Impact of Bilateral
Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, CPB Discussion Paper 298, Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/cpb-discussion-
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a presence in a foreign jurisdiction only to benefit from a stronger
investment protection regime. Although they may be considered
foreign investors under local law, some of these companies may
not actually provide investments and contribute to the economy of
the host state.
Second, with regard to companies’ decision-making process,
prior studies have suggested that companies make decisions to invest abroad largely based on business and tax considerations.
They rarely, if at all, consider the advantages of a particular investor protection regime.204 Yet, as cases discussed in this Article suggest, if and when a dispute is looming, a foreign investor becomes
more aware and responsive to an investor protection regime and
may seek to opportunistically benefit through restructuring or asset transfers. International investment law can respond to these
concerns by reducing the pool of potential claimants under investor protection treaties. For instance, this can be achieved by limiting protection to the local companies under foreign control and
their direct shareholders. Countries could also consider a greater
reliance on the denial of benefits provisions, which would allow
them to revoke a consent to arbitrate where the claimant did not
make any real investments in the host state.
Third, by allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss, international investment law may trump domestic corporate law rules
and impact the corporate structure and governance choices of the
companies investing abroad. One can identify three broad categories of such impact—legal, corporate governance, and structural effects.
Legal effects include changes of the legal framework within which
the corporation operates. This framework changes for the corporation once the company invests abroad and acquires the benefits of
investor protection. Most importantly, for corporate investors, investment treaties not only provide investor protection guarantees,
paper-298-regional-impact-bilateral-investment-treaties-foreign-directinvestment.pdf [https://perma.cc/C42C-P4F3] (concluding that “[u]pper middle
income countries seem to benefit the most from BITs. . . . [but] BITs do not support significantly foreign investment in high income countries.”).
204
See, e.g., COLUM. CTR. SUSTAINABLE INV., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATES (March 2018),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2018/04/07-Columbia-IIA-investor-policybriefing-ENG-mr.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FDF-XV42] (“Studies on determinants
of foreign direct investment (FDI) confirm that other factors—such as market size
and growth, the availability of natural resources, and the quality of hard and soft
infrastructure—tend to be far more important to investors than investment treaties when making the decision to invest.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

240

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 40:1

but in effect alter the dynamics of intra-corporate relationships—
the matters which are generally governed by domestic law of the
company’s state of incorporation. The right of shareholders to
bring individual claims in investment arbitration for reflective loss
allows shareholders to independently make decisions that affect,
and may harm, the corporation. First and foremost, treatyprotected shareholders can decide on their own whether to begin
an arbitration against a host state to recover reflective losses suffered by the corporation. None of the advanced systems of corporate law allow shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss and
benefit from damages otherwise owed to the company. In this
sense, international investment law directly contradicts and will
trump domestic law provisions by allowing shareholders to advance claims for reflective loss.
Governance effects include international investment law’s observable impact on the internal structure of the management and
control relationships within the corporation, as well as relationships between the shareholders and the company and its creditors.
The rules on reflective loss allow shareholders to bring a claim in
ISDS without consulting the management of the company and taking into account the company’s interests. The rules also give
shareholders leverage in any negotiations with the management of
the company. Additionally, they allow shareholders to benefit directly at the expense of the company and its creditors once the
damages are awarded to the shareholders.
As the number of investor-state arbitrations continues to grow,
more data will become available on disputes where shareholders
have exercised their rights and benefited directly at the expense of
the corporation and its creditors. The Eskosol decision demonstrates that the problem is no longer theoretical, and that international law is not concerned about its impact on corporate law and
governance. And the potential disruptive effects of reflective loss
claims are increasing since the share of foreign shareholders in
most leading corporate law jurisdictions continues to grow. For
instance, current data on foreign ownership in corporations shows
that “half of the listed companies in the U.K and Belgium, 40 % of
the companies in France and Germany and around 30 % of the
companies in Spain and Italy have a large foreign shareholder.”205
This suggests that “countries with advanced capital markets and
205
OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 248 n.32 (citing Gaukrodger, supra
note 16, at 49).
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traditional BITs may be beginning to see their first shareholder
claims.”206 This may also “raise the profile of the question of the
comparative treatment of shareholders.”207
International investment law and, in particular, rules on reflective loss claims also lead to structural effects by providing incentives to corporations and shareholders to restructure, in particular,
to benefit from a more advantageous investor protection regime.
Restructuring can be motivated by legitimate business and tax considerations,208 but may also be the product of opportunistic actions—such as treaty- or forum-shopping—by the management or
controlling shareholder.209 The investor’s initial decision to establish a local company is often motivated by business considerations
or legal requirements, such as a requirement to establish a local
company in the host state as a condition of operating in the country.210 Once the investments are established, the corporate ownership chain can change over time as part of the normal course of
business. Foreign investors may also restructure in response to the
regulatory change in the host state to gain access to a BIT and
ICSID or to benefit from a more advantageous investor protection
regime.211 Apart from restructuring, foreign investors may seek
the benefits of IIAs by transferring assets to new or existing entities
or by changing corporate nationality.212 This practice is not in itself
Gaukrodger, supra note 16, at 49.
Id.
208
See OECD Policy Paper, supra note 19, at 242 (noting that intra-group asset transfers may be undertaken to secure a tax advantage).
209 In fact, the allegations of abuse of the BITs through restructuring or other
corporate changes, as well as treaty-shopping are often made by respondents in
investor-state arbitrations. For instance, Venezuela argued in Mobil Corporation v.
Venezuela that Mobil has abused the right by establishing a holding company in
the Netherlands and thereby restructuring its investments after they were made to
allegedly gain access to ICSID. See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶ 32 (June
10, 2010) (noting Venezuela’s allegations that restructuring was completed “to
‘position’ the Claimants for disputes that ‘had arisen’.”).
210
Domestic rules and regulations differ in this respect, but the requirement
is common across jurisdictions. See Schreuer, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that
“many States require the establishment of a local company as a precondition for
foreign investment.”).
211
See Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶ 204 (“[T]he aim of the restructuring . . . was to protect those investments against breaches of their rights by the
Venezuelan authorities by gaining access to ICSID arbitration through the BIT.
The Tribunal considers that this was a perfectly legitimate goal as far as it concerned future disputes.” (emphasis added)).
212
See Voon et al., supra note 71, at 41 (“Host states not infrequently find
themselves responding to claims by investors under international investment
agreements (IIAs) following a series of corporate steps to enable the claim to take
206
207
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illegal under international investment law,213 although it understandably produced a furious reaction from host states, which in
various cases have argued that corporate restructuring and asset
transfers constitute an abuse of corporate form,214 abuse of right,215
abuse of process,216 abuse of the treaty regime,217 or fraud.218 However, as I have emphasized in this Article, the effects of corporate
place: restructuring of existing chains of corporate ownership; transfers of assets
to new or existing entities; or changes in corporate nationality.”); see also Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 27, 2001), 16 ICSID Rev. 469
(2001) (regarding a Mexican investor who restructured its investment in Venezuela by transferring 75% of its shares to a U.S. corporation; under a concession
agreement between the parties, such transfer allowed submission of a claim to the
ICSID arbitration because a majority of shareholders in the Venezuelan investment were nationals of a country party to the ICSID Convention—the United
States); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID Rev. 450 (2005)
(regarding a U.S. corporation that owned 55% shares in the corporation organized
under the laws of Bolivia, but transferred them to a Dutch company before filing
for an arbitration under the Dutch-Bolivian BIT).
213 See Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision
on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 330 (holding that “it is not uncommon in practice and—absent a particular limitation—not illegal to locate one’s operation in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or the substantive law of the
jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT.”).
214
See, e.g., Phoenix Action Ltd v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/5, Award, ¶ 40 (“When there is – as the Respondent contends is the case
here – an abuse of a corporate structure, the Tribunal should look beyond the apparent facts and lift the corporate veil.”).
215
See, e.g., Venezuela Holdings, supra note 15, ¶¶ 161–85 (noting that Venezuela argued, in particular, that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction because
the corporate restructuring by claimants constituted an abuse of right. In reply,
claimants argued that the corporate restructuring was motivated by business reasons—the royalty rate increase by Venezuela in late 2004 and thereafter new investments projected and made by claimants. Claimants also argued that the restructuring was completed before Venezuela announced nationalization of
claimants’ oil projects in Venezuela); id. ¶ 205 (considering that to restructure investments only in order to gain jurisdiction under a BIT for pre-existing disputes
would constitute “an abusive manipulation” of the system of international investment protection under the ICSID Convention and the BITs).
216
See, e.g., Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 176–80
(Sept. 3, 2001) (describing the alleged abuse of process).
217
See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶412 (Sept. 13, 2001) (finding no abuse of the treaty
regime where two related claimants in the chain of corporate ownership bring virtually identical claims under two separate treaties).
218 See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 331 (Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID
Rev. 450 (2005) (finding an insufficient basis to support an allegation of fraud).
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restructuring expand beyond the international law arena. They affect the inner structure of the corporation and contribute to the
ability of shareholders to bring reflective loss claims.
Most importantly, as further discussed below, domestic corporate law and international investment law are not equipped to deal
with the reflective loss claims and their effects on corporate law,
governance, and structure. This suggests that the only solution to
the problem of reflective loss claims might be in private ordering.
4. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF REFLECTIVE LOSS CLAIMS
Legal scholars and arbitration practitioners have suggested
several international law and civil procedure solutions to address
concerns about the multiplicity of claims, such as the risk of double
recovery and inconsistent awards. In theory, they can be used in
addressing distortions created to corporate law and governance by
reflective loss claims. However, as further explained below, most
international law and civil procedure rules are unable to resolve
the problem of reflective loss claims for practical or legal reasons.
In addition, domestic law—most notably, corporate law that regulates intra-company relationships—is generally powerless against
shareholder claims for reflective loss. This is because provisions
under domestic law that seek to limit the shareholder’s ability to
bring claims in ISDS—in direct contradiction to a state’s obligations under investor protection treaties—will likely be trumped by
the state’s international law obligations.
In the absence of a feasible solution under domestic or international law, private ordering offers the best approach to tackle reflective loss claims. It allows shareholders and the company to
agree on the ways to coordinate their competing claims, litigation
strategy and/or settlement terms with the host state. Moreover, to
avoid the problem all together, self-regulation allows shareholders
to waive their right to submit a reflective loss claim in ISDS, giving
up their right for the benefit of the company and its stakeholders.
This allows restoring the processes of the management and control
within the corporation and reducing corporate structural changes
motivated by ISDS. As a result, the corporation is brought back to
the legal framework provided by domestic corporate law.
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4.1. Invoking the help of international law
One way to resolve the problem of reflective loss is to employ
the help of international law. Since the shareholder claims for reflective loss are directly authorized by IIAs, they could be restricted or eliminated altogether through treaty revision and more careful treaty drafting. Instead of allowing shareholders to bring
claims in ISDS and benefit from monetary damages, the treaty
could mimic the domestic law approach and reserve such right to
the company. To account for cases where the company is no longer able to bring a claim (for instance, where the corporation has
been dissolved), the treaty may grant shareholders the exceptional
right to bring such a claim, but provide that damages are to be
awarded only to the corporation (or its successors), but not to the
shareholders bringing the claim. This approach would follow the
NAFTA solution, and would largely eliminate independent claims
by shareholders.
Although invoking the help of international law is a logical solution, it will be very difficult to apply in practice. It would require
a revision of the majority of nearly 3,300 IIAs, which is unlikely to
happen. It also requires a political will on the side of contracting
states, which may be more concerned about attracting foreign investors—through both foreign direct investments and portfolio investments—than about distortions to corporate law and governance created by shareholder claims under investor protection
treaties. Consequently, this solution is possible in theory but highly unlikely to occur in practice.
4.2. Civil procedure solutions
Procedural law offers another solution to the reflective loss
claims. At first sight, it appears that the doctrines of res judicata
(claim preclusion) or collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) could
prevent parallel or consecutive claims brought independently by
the company and its shareholders. The doctrine of res judicata
serves as “[a]n affirmative defense barring the same parties from
litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim
arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that
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could have been—but was not—raised in the first suit.”219 The
doctrine thus bars a second lawsuit between the same parties (or
parties in privity with the original parties) arising from the same
transaction following a final judgment on the merits.220 The doctrine of collateral estoppel “[bars] a party from relitigating an issue
determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first one.”221 As such, the
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not reduce multiple proceedings, but helps to achieve greater consistency among arbitration
awards rendered to the company and—possibly independently—
to its shareholders. Successive investment arbitrations by a company and a shareholder (or vice versa) can sometimes be dismissed
under the doctrines of abuse of process or abuse of right, especially
in cases of vexatious arbitration.222
To address concerns over successive arbitrations, arbitral tribunals have sought to invoke the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.223 Investment tribunals are largely in consensus
today that res judicata constitutes a general principle of law and a
rule of international law.224 They therefore have invoked the doctrine of res judicata in cases where the rules of international law
were to be applied in addition to an investment treaty.225 Similarly,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (10th ed. 2014).
See id. (providing several definitions for the term “res judicata”).
221 Id. at 318.
222
See, e.g., RSM Prod. Corp. et al. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6,
Award, ¶ 4.6.17 (Dec. 10, 2010) (describing the respondent’s reliance on notable
commentators from common-law jurisdictions supporting the view that successive proceedings should be dismissed “even where the requirements of res judicata
may not have been met . . . particularly . . . if the successive proceedings are vexatious.”)
223 See, e.g., id. ¶ 7.1.7 (“[S]hareholders . . . may undertake litigation to pursue
or defend rights belonging to the corporation. However, . . . [i]f they wish to
claim standing on the basis of their indirect interest in corporate assets, they must
be subject to defences . . . including collateral estoppel.”).
224
See Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.11 (Aug. 25, 2014) (“In the Tribunal’s view, the doctrine of res judicata is a general principle of law and is thus an applicable rule of
international law within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1131.”).
225
See, e.g., Mobil Invs. Can. Inc. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 187 (July 13, 2018) ("The principle of res
judicata has long formed part of many—if not most—systems of national law. . . .
[I]t is now an established principle of international law."); id. ¶ 191 ("The question,
therefore, is not whether a principle of res judicata is embodied in international
law but rather what is its extent."); Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican
States (II), ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Mexico’s Preliminary Objection Concerning the Previous Proceedings, Decision of the Tribunal, ¶ 39 (June 26, 2002)
219
220
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arbitral tribunals have relied on the doctrine of collateral estoppel
to prevent re-litigation of an issue in a subsequent investment arbitration. For instance, the tribunal in the second RSM arbitration,
which was brought under the U.S.-Grenada BIT, showed deference
to a prior ICSID arbitration brought under an underlying contract
between the parties invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel.226
The tribunal held that the claimants were barred on the ground of
collateral estoppel from re-litigating conclusions of fact and law
concerning the parties’ rights and obligations that were already resolved in a prior arbitration.227
However, in practice it can be difficult to achieve the application of res judicata in investment arbitration. For the doctrine of
res judicata to operate, one has to satisfy the triple identity test,
which requires that the parties, the object (a type of relief sought),
and the ground (the claims, or the legal arguments relied upon by
the parties) to be identical in both arbitrations.228 Such stringent interpretation of the doctrine of res judicata reduces the operation of
the doctrine and allows the second arbitration to proceed. This
frequently happens because of the lack of identity between the par(“There is no doubt that res judicata is a principle of international law and even a
general principle of law within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the statute of the
International Court of Justice.”); see also Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶ 7.37 (Aug. 25, 2014) ("Applying
NAFTA Article 1131(1), the rules of international law and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Tribunal concludes that the Apotex I & II Award, with its relevant reasons, operates in this arbitration as res judicata as regards both named parties to that arbitration, namely Apotex Inc. and the Respondent. It remains to be
considered in what manner it operates in regard to the specific claims made by
Apotex Inc. in this arbitration.").
226 See RSM Prod. Co. v. Grenada, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/6, Award ¶ 7.1.5
(Dec. 10, 2010) (“[The claimants] were . . . privies of RSM at the time [of the prior
arbitration]. As such, they, like RSM, are bound by those factual and other determinations regarding questions and rights arising out of or relating to the Agreement.”).
227
See id. ¶¶ 7.1.5–7.1.6 (explaining that the parties in the two arbitrations
were not identical because, for the second ICSID arbitration, the company—RSM
Production Corporation—was joined by its three shareholders. However, the tribunal held that the shareholders were bound by the results of the first ICSID arbitration because they were the only shareholders of RSM, jointly owning 100% of
the company).
228
See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Multiple Proceedings—New Challenges for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION—THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2013 3, 8 (Arthur W. Rovine
ed., 2015) (“[T]he main difficulty with [res judicata and lis pendens] is that in general they come into play only if the so-called triple identity test is met. The triple
identity test requires identity of facts, parties and causes of action.” (footnote
omitted)).
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ties in cases where the tribunal adheres to the formalistic interpretation of the treaty, refusing to look behind the separate legal identity of related claimants. For instance, the respondent in the CME
v. Czech Republic arbitration argued that the arbitral tribunal should
reconsider its partial award (and apply res judicata at the quantum
stage) in view of the award in the parallel arbitration in Lauder v.
Czech Republic.229 However, the arbitral tribunal in CME concluded
that the respondent explicitly “waived [its res judicata and lis pendens] defenses by refusing to accept any of the Claimant’s proposals to coordinate the two proceedings.”230 Furthermore, the tribunal established that res judicata did not apply in substance
because the parties in both arbitrations were not identical, they invoked different BITs (and, consequently, different claims based on
these BITs), and the tribunal could not ascertain whether the facts
and circumstances presented to the tribunals in both arbitrations
were the same.231 In the Blusun and Eskosol arbitrations, Italy unsuccessfully argued that Blusun (a shareholder) and Eskosol (the
company) must be considered the same investor, despite the fact
they are two different legal entities.232
Some tribunals have looked into whether the application of res
judicata in investment arbitration could be established through the
application of a concept of a “single economic entity,” which discounts the separate legal existence of the shareholder and the company.233 For instance, the arbitral tribunal in CME v. Czech Republic
considered the issue, but concluded that prior arbitral tribunals
229
See CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 199 (Mar. 14, 2003) (“The Respondent’s view is that
the rule of res judicata must be applied by the Tribunal at the Quantum Phase. . . .
The London Final Award not only was res judicata at the time the Partial Award
was issued; it remains res judicata for the Quantum Phase and, therefore, cannot be
ignored by the Tribunal.”).
230
Id. ¶ 430; see also id. ¶¶ 426–427 (noting that in the first stage of this arbitration, the Czech Republic “refused any coordination of [Lauder v. Czech Republic]
and this arbitration”, and “[a]t the hearing . . . declined anew to accept any of the
Claimant’s alternative proposals” to coordinate the arbitration).
231
See id. ¶ 432 (‘The Tribunal further is of the view that the principle of res
judicata does not apply in favour of the London Arbitration for more than one
reason. . . . the Tribunal cannot judge whether the facts submitted to the two tribunals for decision are identical . . . .”).
232
See Eskosol, supra note 9, ¶ 125 (“Italy further argues that Blusun and
Eskosol must be considered the same investor for the purposes of Article
26(3)(b)(i) of the ECT, even though they are two different legal entities.”).
233
See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic,
UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 436 (Mar. 14, 2003) (considering the concept of the
“single economic entity” and the “company group” theory).
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and the courts had accepted the concept only in exceptional cases—in particular, competition law.234 The same tribunal acknowledged that “prominent authorities” had promoted a “company
group” theory in international arbitration, but refused to follow it,
having established that the concept was not generally accepted in
international arbitration.235
The application of res judicata in investment arbitrations can
also be restricted by the state parties’ interpretation of their investor protection treaties. For instance, in the CME arbitration, the tribunal’s view with respect to res judicata was supported by the
“common position” of the Netherlands and the Czech Republic,
the state parties to the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT invoked in
the arbitration. In their common position, the Netherlands and the
Czech Republic stated that the Lauder arbitration in London did not
govern the CME arbitration in Stockholm.236 In particular, they
stressed that the claims in two arbitrations were made by different
legal entities and that “[c]laims of different legal entities, even
though they may be controlled by the same economic entity, are
not necessarily the same claims . . . .”237
Once the award was rendered, the Czech Republic itself invoked the doctrines of res judicata and lis pendens as part of its
challenge of the award at the Svea Court of Appeal.238 There, the
Czech Republic argued that non-application of these doctrines violated the public order of Sweden (the seat of arbitration) and therefore warranted setting aside of the award. Rejecting this argument,
the court noted that there was no identity between the claimant
parties in the Lauder and CME arbitrations, as required by the
Swedish law.239 The court refused to pierce the corporate veil not234
See id. (“Only in exceptional cases, in particular in competition law, have
tribunals or law courts accepted a concept of a ‘single economic entity,’ which allows discounting of the separate legal existences of the shareholder and the company, mostly, to allow the joining of a parent of a subsidiary to an arbitration.”).
235 See id. (“Also a ‘company group’ theory is not generally accepted in international arbitration (although promoted by prominent authorities) and there are
no precedents of which the Tribunal is aware for its general acceptance. In this
arbitration the situation is even less compelling.”).
236 See id. ¶ 437 (“The agreed minutes of the Common Position of the Netherlands and the Czech Republic . . . support the Tribunal’s view that the London
Award does not govern this arbitration.”).
237 Id. (citation omitted).
238 See Svea Hovrätt [HovR] [Court of Appeals] 2003-05-15 T 8735-01 (Swed.),
https://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/views/pages/getfile.ashx?portalId=89
&docId=1242805&propId=1578 [https://perma.cc/8MAA-P749].
239
See id. at 98 (“[O]ne of the fundamental conditions for lis pendens and res
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ing that “no international cases have been presented in the case in
which, in an actual situation of lis pendens and res judicata, a controlling minority shareholder has been equated with the company.”240
As a result of failing the triple identity test in investor-state arbitrations, in particular, with respect of the identity of the parties,
the res judicata doctrine has failed to provide relief against multiple proceedings in ISDS.241 To mitigate against the strict triple
identity test, advocates of ISDS have suggested to apply in investment arbitration “a relaxed notion” of res judicata.242 Some arbitral
tribunals have formulated and applied a less stringent test of res
judicata.243 However, other authors have pointed out that “it is unclear how this relaxed standard could be justified and what its precise content would be.”244
Other procedural solutions include consolidation of arbitrations, joinder of parties, and—although less desirable for shareholders and their companies—submissions by non-parties. However, the application of these mechanisms—if they are available
under applicable arbitration rules—helps largely the defending
state, but not the company. In theory, consolidation and joinder
would allow the defending state to avoid double recovery and to
reduce the likelihood of conflicting awards. However, these procedural techniques do not diminish the conflict of interests bejudicata is that the same parties are involved in both cases . . . . Identity between a
minority shareholder, albeit a controlling one, . . . and the actual company cannot .
. . exist in a case such the instant one.”).
240
Id. at 98; see also id. at 69 (observing that in the present case, Lauder held
no more than 30% of the share capital in CME’s parent company and was a controlling shareholder in that company).
241 See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 228, at 8 (noting that in investment arbitration multiple proceedings often occur because the triple identity test is not met
since proceedings are initiated by different actors).
242 Id.
243
See, e.g., Apotex Holdings Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/12/1, Award, ¶¶ 7.15–7.16 (Aug. 25, 2014) (discussing several international tribunals and scholars who questioned a division between the object
and the ground of arbitration as two separate conditions of the triple identity test
and have used a simpler analysis for establishing res judicata). Some tribunals
take a more relaxed approach to res judicata. See, e.g., Libananco Holdings Co.
Limited v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, Award, ¶ 548 (Sept. 2,
2011) (finding “the application of a domestic rule of res judicata is there to prevent
the re-litigation of an issue that has already been authoritatively determined; a
treaty rule may serve the different purpose of preventing forum-shopping.” (footnote omitted)).
244 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 228, at 8.
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tween shareholders and the company, since they do not prevent
shareholders from submitting their own claims to arbitration. As
to the submissions by non-parties, they allow the shareholder or
the company to indirectly defend their rights by presenting their
arguments in each other’s arbitrations, but these submissions do
not preclude the shareholder (or the company) from commencing
their own arbitration to defend their rights directly.
However, arbitration rules commonly applied in investment
arbitrations—the ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules and the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules—do not provide for consolidation or
joinder, although these procedural mechanisms are increasingly
available under the rules of arbitral institutions, such as the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce(SCC). In the absence of specific rules, consolidation and
joinder are only available if the parties to a dispute agree to consolidate their arbitrations or join additional parties. In particular, this
requires willingness to consolidate or join the party from the
shareholder and its company. Where the parties cannot agree, as
was the case in the Blusun and Eskosol arbitrations, the hands of the
tribunal are tied and consolidation or joinder are not available.
Other techniques, such as using the same tribunal members for
different arbitrations, can be used to increase the consistency of arbitral awards rendered by tribunals in separate arbitrations commenced by the company and its shareholders. However, this also
requires the agreement by the parties, which is often hard to
achieve in these cases because the interests of the shareholders and
the company conflict. Moreover, it may be difficult to appoint the
same tribunal in cases where the first arbitration has concluded by
the time the second arbitration is commenced.
Additionally, investment tribunals have sought to avoid double recovery by apportioning damages between the shareholders
and their company. The apportionment of damages may allow reducing double recovery, but is hard to do in practice as the loss of
the shareholders is reflective of the company’s loss. In a given dispute, it is often unclear to which extent a particular shareholder
has contributed to the foreign investments and was affected by the
breach. In any case, the apportionment of damages provides for
direct compensation of shareholders for reflective loss. As such, it
does not restore the distortions created by reflective loss claims on
corporate law and governance.
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4.3. Private ordering solution
Private ordering may offer a superior solution to restoring the
corporate governance dynamics distorted by shareholder claims
for reflective loss. Viewed from the contractual theory point of
view, a corporation is a “nexus of contracts” among participants in
the organization, such as shareholders, directors, creditors, suppliers, and employees.245 Under this view, the role of corporate law is
limited to enforcing private contracts, and fiduciary duties “serve
as a legal constraint on managerial opportunism.”246 As a corollary
to that, the freedom of contract suggests that participants in the
corporation shall be free to contract as they wish. The Delaware
courts have also described internal corporate relationship as a
“flexible contract” formed by corporate law together with the corporate charter and bylaws.247
Private ordering, or self-regulation, allows private parties to
adopt systems of rules to regulate their relations within the constraints of existing laws and regulation. Regardless of the view of
the corporation as a contractual or a legal product, private ordering
offers a practical solution to the reflective loss problem. As a general rule, the right to bring claims in investment arbitration shall be
reserved to the corporation. To address the issue of shareholder
claims for reflective loss, corporations can adopt targeted provisions in the corporation’s governing documents—corporate charters or bylaws. Such provisions can provide for a waiver by shareholders of their right to bring claims under international
245
See Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 99, 100 (1989) (“The contractual theory views the corporation as
founded in private contract, where the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts. In this regard, a state charter merely recognizes the existence of a ‘nexus of
contracts’ called a corporation.”).
246 Id. at 119.
247
See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del.
2010) (holding that “[c]orporate charters and bylaws are contracts among a corporation’s shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract interpretation apply.”); Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 152 A 723, 727 (Del. 1930) (“Ever since the decision in the Dartmouth College Case . . . it has been generally recognized in this
country that the charter of a corporation is a contract both between the corporation and the state and the corporation and its stockholders.”); Centaur Partners, IV
v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928 (Del. 1990) (“Corporate charters
and by-laws are contracts among the shareholders of a corporation and the general rules of contract interpretation are held to apply.”).
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investment treaties. In addition, provisions in the corporation’s
governing documents can stipulate that any damages resulting
from a breach by a foreign state of investor protection obligations
are to be awarded to the corporation.
Such private ordering solution aims to bar investment arbitrations of shareholder claims for reflective loss at the outset. Once
the waiver provisions are adopted in the corporate charters or bylaws, they attach to shares and bind the shareholders who accept
the terms of these provisions by acquiring shares in the corporation. However, such a waiver system would only work if the arbitral tribunals are willing to prioritize contract waivers over investment treaty provisions granting shareholders a direct right of
action. As of now, however, as Arato has observed, tribunals seem
to be doing the opposite—rigidly and formalistically “prioritizing
treaty provisions over negotiated contractual bargains.”248 This
practice is flawed from a contractual point of view and should be
abandoned if we really treat consent to arbitration in investment
treaties as an open offer to arbitrate, which is then accepted (albeit
with amendments through a waiver of shareholder claims) by a
foreign investor when it files for arbitration. The proposed private
ordering solution would privilege party choice, which, as Arato
has argued in the context of transnational investment contracts, is
“the best way to protect both the private law values of fairness and
efficiency and the state’s capacity to govern in the public interest.”249
The enforcement of the waiver provisions will rest with the
board, which can choose not to enforce the waiver and allow a
shareholder to proceed in arbitration, for instance, where the corporation is unable to bring its own claim. In effect, this solution allows restoring the domestic corporate law prohibition on shareholder claims for reflective loss, and largely follows the NAFTA
approach to shareholder claims in investment arbitration.
It is also a sound solution from a theory point of view. If the
corporation is the product of private contracts, it is only logical to
amend a contract between the shareholders and the management
for the benefit of the corporation at large. The state can always intervene to correct distortions created by reflective loss claims on
corporate law and governance, for instance, by revisiting the terms
248
Julian Arato, The Logic of Contract in the World of Investment Treaties, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 351, 357 (2016).
249 Id. at 356.
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of a state’s investor protection treaties. Until then, private systems
of rules offer a superior solution to the problem of reflective loss
claims by allowing the shareholders and the corporation to agree
that (1) the right to bring a claim in investment arbitration generally rests with the corporation, and (2) only the corporation can be
awarded damages for losses resulting from a breach of investor
protection obligations.
5. CONCLUSION
Reflective loss claims allow treaty-protected shareholders to
bring individual claims in investment arbitrations for losses suffered by the corporation due to a breach of investor protection obligations. The right to bring these claims provides shareholders
with leverage in their negotiations with corporate management
and allows them to individually make decisions on important issues that affect the corporation. Reflective loss claims also allow
shareholders to divert corporate assets by collecting damages
awarded to them in investment arbitrations. Especially for companies in financial distress, this may harm the corporation, its creditors, non-protected shareholders, and all other stakeholders of the
corporation. In the absence of a feasible solution under domestic
and international law and civil procedure rules, private ordering
offers the best approach to tackle the problem of reflective loss
claims. It allows shareholders and the corporation to agree on the
waiver of the shareholder right to claim for reflective loss in investment arbitration, thereby bringing the corporation back to the
legal framework of domestic corporate law.
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